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The term affordance carries multiple meanings for designers. Traditionally, 
affordances were discussed within a Gibsonian framework as arising from direct perception 
of physical constraints. However, some authors extended the meaning to include learned 
cultural constraints, leading to a theoretical debate about whether designers should draw a 
distinction between perceptual affordances and learned cultural conventions. In this 
dissertation it is suggested that a broader meaning of affordance is more appropriate for 
designers and that a unified account of affordances can be achieved using a cognitive 
conceptualization of perceived affordances. Within this cognitive framework, perceived 
affordances arise from automatic processes in the user that either are inborn or have 
developed over time as consistent interactions produce changes in long-term memory. Well 
learned conventions are examples of the latter. The cognitive mechanisms responsible for 
how perceived affordances arise and how they affect the cognitive system are presented 
along with a flowchart to help guide designer decisions. 
Three experiments examining empirical differences between affordances and 
conventions are reported. The first experiment asked whether users have developed 
conventions in the absence of affordances. A simple task was used in which participants 
pressed buttons in response to directional cues. The results showed that affordances exist 
when the spatial configuration of the buttons is congruent with directional cues. In the 
absence of affordances, most participants demonstrated consistent button-to-action mapping 
that represented a convention. Behavioral differences between affordances and conventions 
were not found. The second experiment confirmed that in ambiguous tasks, conventions 
guide expectancies about button-to-action mappings. The cognitive attributes of affordances 
v 
and conventions were examined in the third experiment by manipulating working memory 
load and expected interaction congruency. Results indicated some behavioral differences 
between acting on affordances and acting on conventions. However, violating the button-to-
action mappings defining either an affordance or a convention produced similar performance 
costs. Taken together, the results suggest that after the initial learning period, conventions 
play a critical role in the perception of a design's available actions, just as do perceptual 
affordances. Therefore, designers ought to employ perceptual affordances when possible and 





CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Human interactions with computing technologies are going to rapidly change over the 
next decade. According to Kurzweil (2005), this change will be driven by an exponential 
growth of technology, which will quickly result in smaller and less expensive computing 
devices. These technologies will become increasingly embedded within everyday 
environments (e.g., multi-touch tables, mobile phones and digital audio players). This 
technological shift to a ubiquitous computing environment will require multidisciplinary 
investigations (involving psychology, engineering, design, computer science, business, etc) 
into the complex interactions between humans and devices (Weiser, 1993). The results of 
such multidisciplinary human-centered design investigations will provide deeper insight into 
how one transforms interactive devices into systems that naturally interface with users.  
My research question is general, but important as society demands technology use 
within everyone’s daily activities. Why do some products make our lives easier, while others 
make our lives harder? It is often the case that easy to use products clearly afford certain 
actions. The embedded affordances provide implicit guidance for users. Lengthy technical 
manuals or repeated demonstrations from an expert operator are not necessary. Users are able 
to expend minimal cognitive effort towards figuring out the available interactions needed to 
complete a current task goal. 
My dissertation research focuses on the cognitive basis of affordances, a major 
concept in design. The term affordance as originally introduced by J. J. Gibson (1979) refers 
to the functions an object offers within an environment. In natural environments affordances 
arise from physical constraints during actor and object interactions (e.g., a metal plate on a 
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door affords pushing). Thus, one important question in the design literature is: How does a 
designer create an interface that affords certain actions? One method is to replicate naturally 
occurring characteristics within the interface’s design. For example, 3-D buttons that have 
shadows as visual cues afford pushing because they have visual characteristics indicating that 
they can be pushed. But, this direct mapping between natural and virtual environments does 
not always best support the user’s needs and may, in many cases, be impossible. According 
to Rogers (2004), there is currently no model of affordances that designers can use to predict 
what functions an interface will afford. And, St. Amant (1999) pointed out that there is only 
an informal relationship between the understanding of an affordance and its influence on 
design decisions. The result is that designers are forced to depend on their own intuitions 
about what actions an interface affords.  
Currently there is a debate about whether the term "affordances" should be reserved 
for physical interactions only (e.g., pressing a physical mouse button) or whether it can be 
used to describe interactions within virtual environments (e.g., clicking and dragging a scroll 
bar). Norman (1999) suggested that designers should refer to “affordances” in interface 
interactions (i.e., interactions with software) as conventions because the action mappings in 
the interaction are “arbitrarily” decided by the designer. For example, in theory, the designer 
who first placed the scroll bar on a window arbitrarily made the decision about whether 
moving the bar up would move the corresponding page up or down. By drawing a distinction 
between affordances and conventions, Norman implies that they are fundamentally different.  
But, one can ask whether the user’s expectation, due to past learning, of a convention based 
action is different from an affordance based action. According to McGrenere and Ho (2000), 
conventions in the software are learned by users, and therefore, are affording actions. Given 
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this debate, one can ask: Are learned convention interactions behaviorally different than 
physical affordance interactions? Further, it is unclear what the cognitive attributes are for an 
affordance or a convention based action. Are affordances and conventions behaviorally 
similar? Or, do they rely differently on cognitive resources? Answers to these questions 
should provide some diagnostic insight into whether designers ought to treat an affordance 
and a learned convention differently.    
Dissertation Organization 
This first chapter frames my general research interests within human-computer 
interaction and provides the motivation for this research. At the heart of this dissertation are 
three articles that examine affordance and convention based interactions. The second chapter, 
Conceptualizing Affordances from a Cognitive Viewpoint, theoretically explores the concept 
of affordances from a cognitive psychology viewpoint with the goal of clarifying for 
designers the meaning and cognitive attributes of affordances. The third chapter, An 
Empirical Investigation of Affordances and Conventions (Still & Dark, 2008), empirically 
examines the concept of affordances and conventions within a simple button pressing task to 
determine whether behavioral differences exists. The fourth chapter, Examining Working 
Memory Load and Congruency Effects on Affordances and Conventions, further empirically 
explores and compares the cognitive attributes of affordances and conventions. The fifth 
chapter provides general conclusions regarding these embedded three articles and describes 
my future research goals. I was the primary researcher and author of these articles. My major 
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CHAPTER 2. CONCEPTUALIZING AFFORDANCES FROM A 
COGNITIVE VIEWPOINT 
 
This article was prepared for the Journal of Human-Computer Interaction. 
Jeremiah D. Still & Veronica J. Dark 
Abstract 
The term affordance carries different meanings within design communities. 
Traditionally, affordances were discussed within a Gibsonian framework in which 
affordances arise from direct perception. Along these lines, some authors now describe 
affordances as being mostly perceptual while others describe them as being culturally bound. 
We suggest that both of these descriptions are correct and that they can be explained from a 
cognitive conceptualization of perceived affordances. From this cognitive perspective, we 
suggest that perceived affordances arise from automatic processes in the user that have 
developed over time through consistent interactions with the environment. Design 
consistency is critical for producing effortless usage, because interaction consistency 
facilitates the formation of long-term memory structures. These structures affect perception 
of an interface without any intent on the part of the user. We explore the underlying 
mechanisms that could explain how affordances arise and interface within the user’s 
cognitive system.  
Introduction 
Overview of the Article  
According to Card, Moran and Newell (1983), understanding the operation of the 
human information processing system is a critical step towards creating usable design. In this 
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article, we discuss automatization, a characteristic of the cognitive system that supports 
effortless experience of perceived affordances because it allows rapid activation of 
knowledge without intention. Automatic processing does not require the limited capacity 
working memory resources that define a bottleneck in awareness or controlled processing; 
the primary requirement for developing an automatic process is consistency of a stimulus-
response mapping. We propose that when a design produces constrained interactions, the 
cognitive pattern recognition system learns to automatically identify the constraints.  We are 
not interested in any specific type of constraint (e.g., physical, social, logical, cultural, etc.); 
rather, we are interested in the cognitive effect of a constraint’s being in play. In this article, 
we describe a cognitive conceptualization of affordance, including the resource limitations of 
working memory, the role long-term memory plays in perception, and the difference between 
automatic and controlled processing; we show how this perspective provides valuable insight 
into affordances; and we conclude by demonstrating how the cognitive attributes of a 
perceived affordance relate to design outcomes. Part of our description is in the form of a 
flowchart depicting the automatization process and development of perceived affordances 
that designers may use when applying these concepts.  
Why Consider Affordances?  
The term affordance was first introduced to the Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) 
community through Don Norman’s (1988) book The Psychology of Everyday Things 
(POET). He suggested that perceived affordances arise from physical, logical, and cultural 
constraints. The concept of affordances was widely adopted in the design literature, but 
Norman (1999) stated that the meaning of affordance had been overly and incorrectly used. 
As noted by McGrenere and Ho (2000), the term had taken on a number of different 
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meanings far from the original meaning proposed by J. J. Gibson (1979).  The overuse of the 
term was a major concern for Norman (1999) who stated that, “Sloppy thinking about the 
concepts and tactics often leads to sloppiness in design. And sloppiness in design translates 
into confusion for users” (p. 41). Despite this “sloppiness”, the recognition of affordances 
within the HCI community has led to better designs. For example, designers have used 
perceived affordances to provide intuitive visual instructions for the users and thereby 
avoided the need to explain how to use simple everyday things. According to Norman 
(1988), “[perceived] affordances result from the mental interpretations of things, based on 
our past knowledge and experience applied to our perception of the things about us” (p. 219). 
However, several important questions remain to be investigated; for example, how is an 
affordance integrated into and how does it operate within the user’s cognitive system? 
The Original Meanings of Affordance 
Several meanings of the term affordance appear in the literature.  J. J. Gibson 
originally conceived of the idea of an affordance and his conception of an affordance is still 
the most often referenced meaning. According to Gibson (1979), “The affordances of the 
environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill. 
The verb to afford is found in the dictionary, but the noun affordance is not. I have made it 
up. I mean by it something that refers both [to] the environment and the animal in a way that 
no existing term does. It implies the complementarity of the animal and the environment” (p. 
127). Gibson’s affordance represents a critical concept for the design community as it 
embodies the interaction between the user and the device based on the user’s perception of 
the properties of the device. In fact, the design literature has emphasized that an important 
attribute of an affordance is how well it fits with the user. For example, Gaver (1991) 
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provided an excellent example of how the emergence of an affordance critically depends on 
the characteristics of the user when he said, “a cat-door affords passage to a cat but not to me, 
while a doorway may afford passage to me but not somebody taller” (p. 80). Affordances 
only emerge from the interaction between the user and the device. Some affordances may be 
good in that they help the user to correctly interact with the device, but some may be bad in 
that they interfere.  Thus, the successful designer will consider what the device’s interface 
affords the target user for good or bad.  
Norman (1988) originally popularized the concept of an affordance within the HCI 
field when used it in a design context and expanded the type of interactions to which the term 
applied. While Gibson’s affordances came from the direct perception of physical constraints, 
Norman suggested that perceived affordances arise from physical, logical, and cultural 
constraints.1 Norman’s view highlighted the fact that both physical and uniquely mental 
constraints directly affect the user’s perception of available actions being offered within an 
environment. An example of a physical constraint might be a wall preventing a person from 
physically passing from one room to another. A logical constraint is one that strongly relies 
on a conceptual model of how a device operates. It is a logical constraint that stops people 
from attempting to open a door that they can see is locked.  A cultural constraint is one that is 
formed through life experiences that are bound to local cultural norms. For example, to turn 
on a light in the US one flips the light switch up, but the opposite is true in the UK 
(Oshlyansky, Thimbleby & Cairns, 2004). Perceived affordances are by-products of 
                                                 
1
 Although the term "affordance", without a modifier, is sometimes reserved for the physical affordances 
described by Gibson (1979), Norman's (1988) term "perceived affordance" actually includes physical 
affordances.  This produces the confusing situation in which the unmodified term is actually subordinate to the 
modified term.   
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constraints that are logical, physical, or cultural. According to Norman (1988), these 
constraints allow simple objects to be usable without extensive instructions. We are taking 
the next step in the process of understanding affordances in design by linking Gibson’s 
concept of direct perception to the cognitive concept of automatic processing and examining 
how affordances are produced and affect the cognitive system. 
Different Theoretical Views of Affordance  
The concept of affordance has taken on a number of different meanings depending on 
the theoretical framework for which it is being adapted. The distributed cognition theory 
focuses on a combination of possible affordances arising from a number of different 
constraints (biological, physical, perceptual, cognitive, social) that emerge during 
collaboration of multiple users interacting with multiple devices (Zhang & Patel, 2006). The 
structuration theory points out the effect of the larger socio-cultural constraints on 
affordances (Vyas, Chisalita & Veer, 2006) and suggests that human actions are supported 
and discouraged by the users’ social structures (see Giddens, 1984). Hartson (2003) used 
Norman’s (1986) stages of action model to identify four different types of affordances: 
cognitive, physical, perceptual, and functional. He described how each type of affordance can 
play a role in creating a successful user interaction. These theories emphasize a number of 
different meanings of affordance but none provide an explicit description of how affordances 
are created or operate cognitively. This is problematic for a designer who needs to predict the 
existence of an affordance within an interface and understand its effect on the current 
activities being performed by the users.  
As previously noted, Norman (1999) and others have suggested that the new views of 
affordance have confused the issue. According to McGrenere and Ho (2000), “As the 
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concept of affordance is used currently, it has marginal value because it lacks specific 
meaning” (p. 8). Similarly, Torenvliet (2003) suggested that “just as printing new money 
devalues existing money, the more new definitions the term affordance gains, the less value 
any one of them has” (p. 13). While we acknowledge that there are many types of 
affordances, we propose that a cognitive conceptualization of perceived affordance 
incorporates the characteristics of the concept that are useful within the context of design.   
Our Purpose and Motivation  
The purpose of this article is to propose a framework that describes the creation of 
perceived affordances and describes the attributes of an affordance within a cognitive system. 
Briefly, a cognitive system operates on the representations arising from structures in long-
term memory. Our purpose is not to add confusion by introducing a new “affordance”, but to 
clarify what an affordance is. Perceived – in perceived affordance – comes from the word 
perception, which describes the user’s process of transforming sensory input into task usable 
representations. Thus, a perceived affordance is a result of an object’s function becoming 
apparent to the user through its cognitive representation. Given this definition, even Gibson’s 
mostly externally based view of affordance is a perceived affordance. Further, we propose 
that the critical distinctions between different types of affordances arise from the 
environment and the cognitive characteristics of the user.  We believe that the cognitive 
perspective will benefit designers because it highlights the role that learning plays in creating 
perceived affordances. 
According to Herbert Simon (1969/1981), “the designer, is concerned with how 
things ought to be – how they ought to be in order to attain goals, and to function” (p. 7). We 
adopt Simon’s perspective in that designers create with the hope of producing objects that 
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help users meet their task goals. A created object is ‘artificial’; it is “molded, by goals or 
purposes, to the environment in which it lives” (Simon, 1969/1981, p. iv). With the 
development of technology, the meaning of ‘artificial’ has become even more extreme as 
objects may only exist within a virtual space. Such an unconstrained space provides 
designers with the ability to create unworldly objects that meet previously unrecognized 
needs. For this reason it is critical to understand the cognitive properties of these designs 
(Visser, 2006).  
Designers may find it beneficial to take advantage of natural-world constraints within 
artificial environments. In an unbound (artificial) environment this could be accomplished by 
replicating naturally occurring characteristics within the interface design (e.g., 3-D buttons 
that have shadows as visual cues). But, the direct mapping between the natural and virtual 
environments may not always best support the user’s task needs and may in many cases not 
even be possible (Rogers, 2004). When natural mappings are not employed within a virtual 
object it is not clear whether actions may be afforded. This leaves designers to depend on 
their familiarity with what an interface should afford and how it ought to affect the cognitive 
system, making design decisions difficult.  
You and Chen (2007) highlighted a particular benefit of affordances; “the concept of 
affordance challenges designers to avoid the reliance on symbols and cultural conventions in 
design. Instead, it encourages them to utilize possible intuitive actions that can serve as 
function in the process of user-product interaction” (p. 29). However, as suggested by Raskin 
(1994), the “intuition” experienced from an affordance could be reframed as the user’s 
familiarity with the object’s functions. The implication, which is that well learned cultural 
conventions could become just as "intuitive" as Gibson’s affordances, fits well with a 
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cognitive view.  Cultural conventions are the result of many consistent interactions that 
produce coherent structures in long-term memory. 
Norman (1999) described conventions as arbitrary mappings between an action and a 
function that become common within some group. Conventions are often created within 
interface design when no perceptual affordances are available. We suggest that if a 
convention is used frequently, it becomes a perceived affordance. Thus, we agree with 
McGrenere and Ho (2000) who stated that software applications may afford specific 
interaction actions. These afforded actions emerge from learned conventions within a virtual 
interface. “The functions that are invokable by the user are the affordances in software… 
Norman claims that a scrollbar is a learned convention and implies that it is not an 
affordance. We disagree. The fact that the object affords scrolling is an affordance that is 
built into the software. The information that specifies this affordance is in fact a learned 
convention… [Acting on the bar will either move the page up or down]” (p. 6).  
Although the desktop user is physically unconstrained to click anywhere within the 
visible screen, the past experiences of the user will make clicking the close-window button 
highly likely behavior when the desire is to end an interaction (see Figure 1). It is this type of 
constrained interface interaction (i.e., one that depends on learning) that defines Norman’s 
(1999) conventions. Naturally occurring physical constraints are affordances (e.g., pushing a 
mouse button), while more arbitrary constraints (e.g., associating page movement with scroll 
bar direction) are conventions. When a physical affordance is present, the designer and user 
are likely to view the situation in a similar way.  When a physical affordance is not present, 
the designer needs to consider the possibility that a convention or a perceived affordance 
exists.  When we investigated whether users act on an affordance differently compared to a 
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convention in a very simple button experiment (Still & Dark, 2008; see Chapter 3), we found 
that they did not.  The convention and affordance interaction types did not differ from each 
other as measured through response agreement or response consistency. This result suggests 
that highly learned, consistent artificial interactions may become as effortless as naturally 
occurring affordances.  
 
 











 Affordance (physical) 
Figure 1.  Displays a user acting on both physical and virtual affordances to close a window. 
This figure shows how both the user’s physical and cognitive attributes structure actions. 
Cognitive constraints guide a user’s actions as much as physical constraints. When a user 
needs to perform a routine task like closing a window, the user does not use the mouse to 
randomly click around the virtual desktop but instead clicks only on the location likely to 
accomplish the task (i.e., the virtual button). 
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The proposed cognitive approach takes into account the user’s underlying 
representation of a design whether it is constrained virtually or physically. Gibson’s (1979) 
and Norman’s (1988) illustrations of affordances focused on the physical constraints that 
arise within user and object interactions. In contrast, we propose that, for design purposes, it 
does not matter whether constraints arise through a physical or psychological means; for 
either case there is an affordance in play. Although there may be some historical difference in 
how the representation supporting a physical affordance and a virtual affordance become part 
of an cognitive system, once the representation is part of the system, its impact on behavior is 
similar. It produces effortless (direct) perception of a situation supporting a possible action.   
A Cognitive System Perspective  
As noted earlier, a cognitive system assumes that there are internal structures in long- 
term memory and that these structures can be activated by the information from the external 
world or by internal goals. Long-term memory changes constantly as a user experiences the 
world.  The more frequently a situation is experienced, the stronger the long-term memory 
structure associated with that situation. Cognitive processing is constrained by the relatively 
limited amount of information that working memory is able to process at any time. 
Therefore, the system heavily relies on perceptual and interaction patterns that are stored in 
long-term memory to provide expectations about a situation. Both external environmental 
cues and internal higher order task goals contribute to the activation of long-term memory 
structures. If structures become activated, then the information processing represented by 
those structures is directly available, without consuming working memory resources. Thus, 
within the context of a cognitive system, a user’s perception of an interface is a reflection of 
a representation that was molded by activated long-term memory structures through a 
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combination of environmental and cognitive contributions. In the sections to follow we 
expand upon components of the cognitive system, the process of automatization and the role 
of consistency in that process. 
Working Memory  
Working memory is associated with awareness.  It is a temporary storage usually 
discussed as a mental workspace for controlled processing (e.g., Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley, 
1992). For example, this work area could be used as calculation space for complex math 
problems or as an area in which visual information can be manipulated to produce an image 
in awareness. Current theories of working memory suggest that this work space may hold 
approximately four items2 (Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 2001). Thus working memory has a 
limited capacity, and, by extension, the amount of information available to awareness at any 
point in time is limited.  
Working memory is also where information is assembled (encoded) for long-term 
memory storage. In addition to general world knowledge, long-term memory contains the 
type of information that most people associate with the term "memory"; that is, it contains 
knowledge and information about life events. Long-term memory is large, with no known 
storage limitations. Recently, Baddeley (2002) has incorporated long-term memory into his 
working memory model making it a more general model of memory. This adaptation is 
important to designers because it acknowledges the direct influence of past experience, 
through long-term memory, on current interface representations.   
                                                 
2
 This estimate of working memory capacity is for visual stimuli presented during articulatory suppression. 
16 
The amount of working memory resources currently being used must be considered in 
any task. The more working memory resources required by a task, the more effortful it is.  
Effortful processing is known to be slow and serial, however it is flexible. Technologies 
should avoid drawing on limited working memory resources as the user is often directing 
these resources to other tasks or goals. Technology should support the user’s goals at the 
periphery of attention. In other words, the user should not be spending working memory 
resources trying to interact successfully with a familiar device. The relationship between 
acquiring knowledge and cognitive processing difficultly depends on the appropriateness of 
supportive structures in long-term memory. Typically interaction sequences and tasks must 
go through at least an initial heavy learning process involving limited capacity (i.e., working 
memory) resources before the process occurs without awareness. In addition to considering 
the amount of limited working memory resources required by a task, one can consider what 
attributes of the device could facilitate easy and consistent mapping of a task across a number 
of encounters.   
The Impact of Long-term Memory on Working Memory 
Current design consistency principles focus on minimizing the demands on working 
memory (e.g., Apple Computer, Inc., 1992; Nielsen, 2002; Shneiderman & Plaisant, 2005). 
We argue that in order to know how to minimize working memory demand, one must 
consider long-term memory’s role in perception. The representations that are in working 
memory depend on knowledge and structures currently in long-term memory, i.e., what is 
already known.  Although there are many specific models of memory, Cowan’s (1988) 
model is particularly well suited to capturing the interaction between working memory and 
long-term memory. Cowan suggested that short term storage is actually highly activated 
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regions within long-term memory. This is a critical idea that has been missing from many 
designers’ model of the user’s cognitive system. The focus has been only on the limitations 
of working memory and not on the relationship between the contents of working memory and 
the contents of long-term memory. Long-term memory structures affect how representations 
are formed within working memory. Thus, by influencing the creation of representations, 
long-term memory directly affects the user’s perception. Once this relationship is 
acknowledged, the designer has a new tool that may be used to circumvent the limitations of 
working memory (cf., Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995).  Interactions with interfaces may be made 
easier for the user by providing information in such a way that is easily interpreted 
(represented) because the information relies heavily on previously consolidated 
representations available in long-term memory (i.e., more information can be included within 
a single representation in short-term memory).  
Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) described how well-developed long-term memory 
structures can ease working memory load. Basically, experts are able to overcome the 
capacity limitations of working memory by developing domain-specific perceived 
affordances. Novice chop stick users must direct cognitive effort, or working memory 
resources, towards navigating the chop sticks to allow eating noodles. Their actions must be 
focused on how to hold the chop sticks in a way that picks up the noodles. However, an 
expert user of chop sticks can eat quickly while simultaneously carrying on a complex 
discussion.  The knowledge of how to use chop sticks to pick up food has already been stored 
for the expert user in long-term memory.  It is directly accessible without cognitive effort; it 
is a perceived affordance.   
18 
Designers implicitly understand the relationship between learning and long-term 
memory.  For example, designers do not consider a user’s interactions with a mouse when 
the user is learning a new software program to be part of the learning process, because the 
designers assume that the user already knows how to use the mouse. This assumption reflects 
the fact that designers understand the impact of the user’s long-term memory on the current 
interaction. While most physical affordances are apparent to users regardless of their specific 
past experiences because the affordances reflect structures that are the result of evolved 
history, perceived affordances reflect specific users with specific histories. Designers need to 
consider specific histories. The question is whether there was enough consistency in the past 
interface interactions that a perceived affordance exists.   
According to Hannon (2008), “…our ability to learn and use new technologies is 
contingent upon our experience with prior technologies. On a computer, for instance, each 
time we learn a new interaction idiom such as drag-and-drop, or double clicking, or scrolling, 
we adopt new ways of understanding how software applications and hardware devices work” 
(p. 60). Designs that follow already learned consistencies take advantage of the perceived 
affordances in technology and as a result, the device interactions are processed effortlessly. 
This is similar to how the pattern recognition system processes the text you are reading 
without any awareness on your part of how you are processing each letter and compiling 
words. 
Describing Automatic and Controlled Processing    
All interface interactions affect long-term memory structures when interaction 
instances are stored in long-term memory. If consistency is detected across these instances, 
the interaction may become automatized, but consistency does not guarantee automatization. 
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By definition, a process is automatized when it does not require working memory resources 
for the target action to become apparent. Within the psychology literature controlled 
processing is associated with the awareness of on-line progress towards a product’s 
production while automatic processing is associated with only being aware of the product 
produced and not the production process itself. Posner and Snyder (1975) offered diagnostic 
criteria that discriminated between these two types of cognitive processing (for a more recent 
account, see Moors & Houwer, 2006). Automatic processing is described as not being open 
to awareness, rendered without intention, carrying a light working memory load and leading 
to rapid responses to stimuli. Controlled processing is described as being open to awareness, 
resulting from intention, carrying a heavy working memory load and leading to slower 
responses to stimuli. It is important to note that both of these processes result in a product 
that is available to awareness.   
One distinctive indicator of an automatic process is whether or not one has control 
over the process. The Stroop (1935) effect is a classic example of two automatic processes 
competing for a verbal response, occurring without intention, that happens to compete with 
the intended response. In the Stroop task participants are shown words such as, GREEN, 
BROWN, YELLOW, RED that are presented either in a visually congruent colored ink 
(GREEN is printed in green ink) or a visually incongruent colored ink (GREEN is printed in 
red ink). The participants’ task is to report the ink color of the word ignoring the meaning of 
the word. Thus, this task instructs participants to only process a single stimulus dimension - 
color. The Stroop effect is the finding that participants have difficulty naming the ink color 
when the meaning of the word is incongruent. This difficulty arises because the response 
produced by the unintended automatic process of reading the word competes with the 
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intended output response of producing the ink color. Another characteristic of an automatic 
process is that it occurs without awareness, thus it is not available for introspection. Hence, 
people cannot actually describe what mental process they rendered to know how they read 
the word red or what made them say red, only the product is available.   
In contrast, the major distinguishing characteristic of a controlled process is its 
demands on working memory resources. When people are aware of their processes, they are 
able to regulate and describe their operations. For example, when participating in a 
conversation one can reflect on what was said and why it was said. But, a controlled 
rendering of a task consumes most of the available working memory resources, making it 
difficult to successfully render two cognitively demanding tasks at once. For example, having 
a serious phone conversion while driving in heavy traffic necessitates the continual switching 
of resources between the two tasks. In fact, it has been shown that if resources are engaged in 
completing the conversation task, the ability to successfully monitor the driving task will 
significantly decrease (see Recarte & Nunes, 2003; Strayer, Drews & Johnston, 2003; Strayer 
& William, 2001). 
 While both driving and conversing were just described as demanding tasks that need 
a large amount of working memory resources to be rendered successfully, oftentimes 
engaging in a conversion and driving a vehicle represent a mixture of controlled processing 
and automatic processing. For example, some actions associated with operating a vehicle are 
consistently performed the same way, such as turning the vehicle off or on or moving the 
vehicle left or right with the steering wheel; once learned, these actions can be performed 
automatically. These types of automatic processes consume few working memory resources 
because the long-term memory structures are so well constructed that the whole structure acts 
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as a single unit, or schema. According to Norman and Shallice (1986), “…when the source 
schema for a task such as driving an automobile has been selected, all its component schemas 
become activated, including schemas for such acts as steering, stopping, accelerating, 
slowing, overtaking, and turning. Each of these component schemas in turn acts as a source 
schema, activating its own component schemas (braking, changing gear, signaling, and so 
on)” (p. 6).  However, tasks that are dynamic, such as engaging in a serious conversation or 
driving in a busy environment, require significant working memory resources. Processes that 
are controlled consume the most working memory resources; therefore performing multiple 
controlled tasks demands limited resources for each task leading to a bottleneck in working 
memory processing.  
Consistency in the Stimulus/Response Relationship is Critical 
Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) explained how tasks are a mixture of both controlled 
processes and automatic processes. They demonstrated that after consistent, repetitive 
practice in a visual search task, participants were able to search through multiple distractors 
without the number of distractors modulating search times. Basically, they showed that with 
enough practice in a consistent mapping situation, a once mostly controlled task will become 
mostly automatic. However, if the situation is variable, or not predictable, the task will 
continue to be processed in a controlled fashion that requires working memory resources 
regardless of the amount of practice. For example, how could typing on a keyboard become 
automatic if the key positions periodically changed?  The practiced task must be consistent to 
have the opportunity to become an automatic process.  
Perceived affordances are produced by a consistent design, which generates 
consistent interactions between actions and functions. Further, for users to recognize 
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interaction consistency they must have a good mental model of how the device operates (see 
Norman, 1988). According to Norman, a good mental model facilitates rapid formation of 
structures within long-term memory, because the user is able to establish a clear cause and 
effect relationship between the user’s actions and the device’s responses. Consistent design is 
a reflection of the many constraints applied within the literature. Logically, something that is 
highly consistent is highly constrained. Thus, this provides some evidence for why the 
consistent design principle is important to consider within a cognitive framework. 
Indeed, the design literature already highlights the importance of design consistency 
within their fundamental principles with the goal of improving a design’s usability (e.g., 
Apple Computer, Inc., 1992; Nielsen, 2002; Shneiderman & Plaisant, 2005). Consistency in 
design has had a major impact on search behavior within the context of the internet. One may 
infer that users make fewer navigation errors if a website’s formatting is consistent versus 
varied. An example of consistency in design is found within the web site programming 
community referred to as Cascading Style Sheets (CSS). CSS separates the formatting of 
style and content by having a single file determine the formatting for all the pages within a 
website (Bos, Celik, Hickson & Lie, 2006). CSS was developed so that web designers could 
modify content without having to recursively include style code. However, as revealed by 
considering the impact on the user of the consistency, the use of CSS actually minimizes the 
user’s need to employ cognitive effort while searching through a website. For example, an 
underlined word would always indicate a hyperlink on all pages within a website. This 





Building Perceived Affordances  
Our description of perceived affordances focuses on the psychological interpretation 
of what an interface communicates and is not tied down to any specific type of constraint: 
logical, cultural, social or physical. Rather, perceived affordances are the result of continuous 
learning. The learning reflects changes in the user’s cognitive system that capture the 
predictable (regular) characteristics present within a complex operating environment.   
The cognitive system view provides evidence for how perceived affordances are 
acquired. The concept of perceived affordances proposed here is not directly associated with 
any recent descriptive account of affordance; rather, it is integrative. From a cognitive 
perspective, a perceived affordance is a reflection of previous knowledge rapidly and without 
awareness, influencing the pattern recognition system.  
The designer must decide what aspects of the interaction can and should be 
automatized and then capitalize on prior knowledge that the user brings to the situation.  
Designers should not assume tabula rasa, but instead should consider the current foundation 
upon which the new task will be built, especially if perceived affordances may be in place.  
That is, the designer must recognize that previous knowledge may not be task neutral, it may 
interfere with or facilitate the user’s interaction with the new task or technology.  
 The flowchart in Figure 2 depicts the process by which a perceived affordance can be 
created in a user. The flowchart represents the interplay between the user’s cognitive 
outcomes associated with an interface’s interaction, the actual design of an interface, and the 
design elements imparted by the designer. Further, it highlights a user’s cognitive system and 
the flow of design outcomes; that is, it predicts the type of cognitive processing that occurs 
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after a user has some experience interacting with the device. The circles indicate the start or 
stop of the flowchart analysis. A diamond reflects a task evaluation. The response to those 
evaluations (yes or no) directs the flow through the chart in the direction of the arrows. The 
large rectangles represent the clarification of task processing (controlled or automatic 
process) and the cylinder represents a variable number of practice sessions required for 
sufficient experience, which depends on the complexity, familiarity and working memory 
load associated with the task.  
 This flowchart clarifies how perceived affordances are achieved from the designer 
perspective. When using the flowchart begin at the “start” circle and progress in the direction 
of the arrows. The first question, “Perceived Affordance?” refers to whether or not the task is 
already an automatic process within long-term memory. The second question, “Motivated?” 
is a motivational assessment. If the user will not put forth the effort to complete or select the 
task, the analysis must stop and the situation must be reexamined. The third question, 
“Designed to be Consistent?” asks if the present and past interactions between the user and 
device are consistent. If the interaction is identified as being a controlled process it will 
require working memory resources. Nevertheless, if the technology interaction is consistent, 
the novel process may become automatic for the user. This may take a lot of trials depending 
on the complexity of the pattern and learning conditions. If the user is not able to complete 
the consistent task effortlessly after numerous practice trials, the user may not be detecting 
the constraints. In other words, the user may not be recognizing the design’s consistency. 
However, if the user recognizes the consistency, then more practice trials are required. The 
last question, “Effortless?” asks if enough practice sessions were completed for the action to 
become a perceived affordance (i.e., available through direct perception).  If the user is not 
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effortlessly interacting with the design, the practice must halt and the interface’s design 
consistency needs to be reconsidered.   
 
Figure 2. Evaluating user and design interactions within the context of automatic and 
controlled processing 
 
 From a cognitive system perspective the lack of transparency, natural mapping, or 
appropriate feedback may cause increased time spent within the practice sequence (see 
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Figure 2). If the processing flowchart indicates that the device interaction task ought to be an 
automatic process, yet the task seems to be consuming a lot of resources after many practice 
sequences, designers should reconsider their interface and what it is communicating to the 
user (see Hutchins, Hollan & Norman, 1986; Norman, 1988, for more information). In other 
words, the designer may be predicting that the system interface is displaying consistency, but 
the user is not able to perceive the consistency. The user may not be able to determine the 
cause and effect relationship between their input and the devices output. This may be due to 
the user having difficulty finding a correct mental model of how the device operates, thus 
inhibiting the formation of a perceived affordance. Or, it may be that prior interaction 
structures are interfering with the desired outcome. 
Negative Transfer from Prior Structures 
The user’s interaction experiences are always molded by the activated structures 
within long-term memory even if they are inappropriate. Consequently, if an interface’s 
controls appear familiar but now have a different meaning, the designer may have created a 
phantom affordance. It is not the case that new information simply supplants old information. 
Rather, interference occurs when the old information competes with the learning of the new 
information (Keppel & Underwood, 1962). Psychologists use the term negative transfer to 
describe incorrect mapping of previous response knowledge onto different response 
situations (e.g., Besnard & Cacitti, 2005). For example, experienced users already have 
structures in long-term memory for what specific buttons do on an interface. So, although it 
might be cheaper and easier from an installation perspective to just keep a previous button in 
place and change its function, explicitly informing the user of the change or posting a sign 
stating that “now” the button does a different thing, this is likely to produce negative transfer. 
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Negative transfer could result in a potentially dangerous situation because an expert operator 
may without awareness respond to the traditional meaning of the button. Posting a flyer 
spatially near the interface that describes the change or verbally instructing the user of a 
function change is not enough. The designer needs to create a visually different button 
because it has a new system function. Providing different visual cues for new functions 
should decrease the likelihood of negative transfer or phantom affordances in which a known 
cue is associated with an unexpected response.  
 The effects of perceived affordances on task outcomes can be either positive or 
negative depending on the congruency of the current and previous interfaces. For example, a 
standard in web design is to identify hyperlink words by underlining them. For experienced 
users, underlined words conceptually afford clicking. But, what if the characteristic feature of 
underlining did not really represent a hyperlink on a web page? In this case, the designer has 
created a phantom affordance (e.g., underlining words now indicates a heading rather than 
the conventional hyperlink). Phantom affordances appear without the intention of the users, 
causing them frustration. These disconnects between the interface design and the user’s 
previous knowledge may lead to unsuccessful interactions. 
 Chapter 4 empirically explores the effect of violating expectations in a button 
pressing task. We found that reversing the mapping between action and function produced an 
incongruency cost resulting in decreased task performance. Interestingly, the cost of 
reversing the action to function mapping was similar for physical affordances and 




Selecting a Perceived Affordance 
We have suggested that perceived affordances arise from a user’s current interaction 
representation. There are often multiple types of these interactions available for selection 
within a single object. According to Brown and Blessing (2005), there are a very large set of 
possible object functions and these affordances are reduced through context-dependency. 
From our viewpoint this large pool of possible affordances arises from a large number of 
possible representations stemming from both physical and mental structures. However, 
although many affordances exist, it likely that a single affordance becomes apparent because 
of its relatedness to ongoing task needs, familiarity of interaction and environmental 
contingencies.    
It is common for authors to propose several perceptual affordances for the same 
object depending on physical interaction conditions (i.e., stemming from the environment). 
For example, Michales (2003) pointed out how tool usage changes the user’s possible 
selection of affordances. In addition, she writes that, “The next step is the spooky one: The 
implement that permits the action must be built, or designed and built: Object X affords 
lifting by a crane that can lift twice as much as any existing crane. The frozen pond affords 
skating when someone invents skates”(Michaels, 2003, p. 141). Ecological researchers often 
point out that once a user is using a tool, new affordances appear. It is clear from Michaels’ 
quote that the way affordance has been used leads to the production of seemingly an endless 
number of affordances.  
Why is it feasible to discuss tools of the world providing new affordances, but not 
cognitive tools (Norman, 1993) such as representations? Just as new perceptual affordances 
can emerge from interacting with a different physical tool, new perceived affordances arise 
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from using different mental tools, or representations. For example, humans often chose to 
represent information in different forms depending on their current task needs. When 
counting the number of people attending a conference presentation, it is easier to visualize 
and denote the total amount in terms of tally marks. However, if the task were to determine 
the total number of chairs in a room, it is easier to think in Arabic notation when multiplying 
the rows by columns. A variety of cognitive representations allow humans to successfully 
complete a diverse set of tasks. Dimensional reduction of a complex environment into a 
usable representation is a fundamental part of the cognitive system given our working 
memory limitations. For example, objects in a room activate an actor’s source schema 
producing an internal context of their operating environment. This internal pattern of 
activation makes task-related affordances apparent with little cognitive effort.  
According to You and Chen (2007), there may be a “…seemly infinite [number of] 
affordances, which will catch the user’s attention most? Why is an action executed but not 
the others? Questions like these might be important to designers, but they are not within the 
scope of the theory of affordance” (p. 28). As just noted, however, from a perceived 
affordance perspective we are able to begin answering these questions. Given that a device 
activates multiple affordance representations depending on the user’s current physical or 
knowledge characteristics, how is a specific representation selected over the others? 
According to the biased competition model of Desimone and Duncan (1995), the 
representation with the strongest activation wins. The strength of the representation is 
determined by a combination of the artifact’s physical attributes and the user’s internal 
representation - which is heavily influenced by higher order task goals - that most closely fits 
the system’s current state.  
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Even having defined a method for selecting an affordance, the practical question of 
whether a physical affordance or a perceived affordance carries more activation remains. It 
might seem obvious to think that affordances stemming from external information carry more 
weight than affordances stemming from internal information, and that they are therefore 
more likely to be used, but recent research has shown that external information is not always 
preferred over information stored in memory. For example, users may actually act based on 
remembered information over graphically presented information to complete some tasks. 
According to Gray and Fu (2004), millisecond differences in time to execute a task matters to 
whether a user selects to retrieve knowledge-in-head or in-the-world. If it saves the user a 
marginal amount of time to potentially use a faulty memory over retrieving reliable 
information from an external source, users often will chose the internal memory (Gray & Fu, 
2004). These results suggest that even when a physical affordance is presented in a 
perceptually salient and natural manner, the user may still choose to use a perceived 
affordance from long-term memory. More research will be needed to determine the effect 
these perceived affordances have within the context of usability. 
Relationship to Gibson (1979) 
Gibson (1979) stated that the two primary features of a perceptual affordance are that 
it is the result of direct perception and that it does not require excessive amounts of learning. 
Our view of perceived affordances is that direct perception can be conceptualized in terms of 
automatic processing, which is the result of activation of long-term memory structures. To 
say that a perceived affordance is the result of direct perception means that it is automatically 
processed; its impact on the pattern recognition system is rapid, occurs without awareness, 
and does not require any working memory resources. 
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As we have noted, every time users interact with an interface, they learn. That is, each 
instance of learning produces a small change within the organizational structure of a user’s 
long-term memory (Cowan, 1988; Logan, 2002; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). The amount of 
learning required depends on whether or not an existing structure is in place to support the 
incoming information. For example, if there are not any existing structures in place, one can 
refer to the user as a novice, but if well-developed structures exist, the user is referred to as 
an expert. An expert user already has a number of perceived affordances in play within a 
complex interaction environment (cf., Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995). These perceived 
affordances build on each other, which allows the expert user to minimize learning 
requirements within complex interaction environments. Further, experts are able to render 
complex tasks without many errors or much effort. However, a novice user would have a 
very difficult time completing the same task due to the lack of long-term memory structures 
that produce necessary perceived affordances. Thus, minimal learning is continuously 
measured in reference to the current state of knowledge as learning is always building on 
previous experiences.  
Conclusions  
It has been suggested by a number of authors that affordances should include the 
observer’s previous knowledge as indicated by Gibson’s (1979) mailbox example in which 
he pointed out that direct perception allows mailboxes to afford inserting letters. However, 
others (e.g., Greeno, 1994) have pointed out that Gibson’s mailbox example is atypical for 
his description of direct perception as it requires the activation of symbolic representations 
stored in memory containing the properties that provide identification of a mailbox. We 
suggest a human has direct perception of affordances in the external world because that is the 
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way the cognitive system evolved, but a human also has direct perception of aspects of the 
world as a function of learning (cf., Marcus, 2004). In other words, it does not matter 
whether affordances reflects perceptual or learned constraints; in both cases the interaction is 
experienced automatically. Direct perception provides effortless insight into what actions an 
object affords. Whether the direct perception arises from physical properties of the world and 
built-in to humans through evolution or is a result of automatic processing achieved through 
learning may be of interest to perception theorists, but it should be irrelevant from the 
designer’s perspective. Designers should consider both kinds of direct perception, or the 
usability of their designs will suffer. 
Previous knowledge in long-term memory plays a critical role in cognitive pattern 
recognition. Affordances emerge from constraints formed through interactions between an 
external object and the user’s personal characteristics (Gaver, 1991). In other words, 
affordances are the result of an interaction between the external object provided physical 
constraints and the user’s perception. The representation being used during task completion 
will drive the meaning of the specific affordance in play. Advanced knowledge, or expertise, 
is required to identify perceived affordances that exist within less physically constrained 
environments. The more degrees of freedom an interaction requires, the less likely a novice 
will detect the underlying structure or consistency. Highly constrained interactions allow 
novices to easily detect the consistency. However, with experience, users may learn to 
recognize complex patterns within less constrained interactions; they may develop perceived 
affordances.  
The literature has yet to describe the cognitive process by which affordances are 
created. This article provides a framework that explicitly describes the process from which 
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perceived affordances arise and the cognitive attributes associated with such an outcome.  
Within the framework described, perceived affordances result from automatic processing of 
current information because structures within long-term memory guide the processing.  
Perceived affordances can reflect many different types of constraint. Automatic processing is 
defined as occurring without awareness, intention (through direct perception) and without 
any effort. These attributes are also used to describe affordances. Though a perceived 
affordance is not exactly what Gibson (1979) meant by affordance, it does have more 
application for designers. A number of authors have mapped affordances onto a number of 
different frameworks trying to achieve more applicability (see Zhang & Patel, 2006; 
Baerentsen & Trettvik, 2002; Vyas, Chisalita & Veer, 2006); we believe that our view unifies 
these different frameworks into one appropriate for design applications.  The cognitive view 
of perceived affordance clarifies the aspects of an interaction that are important for design. It 
does not focus on a particular type of constraint, but rather on the possibility that a constraint 
may be in play.  A constraint may be the result of consistent interactions, which lead to the 
formation of long-term memory structures that directly affect working memory 
representations without any intention or effort on the part of the user.  
Future work needs to consider common affordances that arise within a group of 
experts (i.e., those who have had many consistent experiences within an interface).  Applying 
the perceived affordances framework, for instance, the designer may become more sensitive 
to the fact that users who have been using a window, menu and pointer schema for years 
would directly perceive this platform much differently than would a novice. Consequently, 
developing future interfaces that are optimal for the novice user might not be optimal for the 
expert user. Designers working within the cognitive system framework would be more likely 
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to recognize that previously adopted platforms should have heavy influence on future 
platforms’ usability. According to Hannon (2008), designers often modify their products’ 
‘contingencies’ without any clear progression towards a more usable product. Instead of 
focusing on interaction design challenges, such as creating interaction conventions as a 
community, each company often creates its unique solution. This independence may lead 
users to become frustrated with technology as they are required to interact with more and 
more devices to complete their daily activities.  
It is our hope that the cognitive system framework will help designers create 
interactions that take advantage of perceived affordances when appropriate. This approach 
may encourage designers to produce devices that create minimal cognitive cost. Decreasing 
the user’s cognitive load will create smarter users (Sternberg, 1986). And, designers always 
want smarter users!  
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CHAPTER 3. AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF AFFORDANCES 
AND CONVENTIONS 
 
This article was published in the Proceedings of the Third International Conference on 
Design Computing and Cognition. 1  
 
Jeremiah D. Still & Veronica J. Dark 
Abstract 
 There is a debate in the literature concerning whether a distinction between 
affordances and cultural conventions ought to be drawn. It is possible that in the absence of 
affordances users develop conventions to resolve interaction ambiguity. We explored 
whether a difference between affordances and conventions existed through a button pressing 
task. Our results show that affordances exist when the spatial button configuration is 
congruent with directional cues. When affordances were not available, most participants 
demonstrated consistent button-to-action mapping that sometimes represented a convention. 
Additionally, there was no difference in response time in the affordance and convention 
conditions.  
Introduction 
 A question of concern to designers is why some designs cause repeated failure while 
others facilitate error free use. That is, what aspects of a design lead the user to more easily 
comprehend the design’s functions?  In his book the Psychology of Everyday Things 
(POET), Norman (1988) suggested that good designs provide implicit visual instructions that 
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constrain how an object should be used [1].  The constraints can be physical, logical, and/or 
cultural in nature.  Because these implicit visual instructions are simply understood and do 
not demand much cognitive effort (limited working memory resources) to figure out the 
proper interaction to meet the user’s task goals, Norman referred to them as perceived 
affordances in order to distinguish the concept from the more narrow concept of affordances 
as developed by J. J. Gibson (1970).  Gibson coined the term to capture the idea that the 
physical structure of some object allows observers to directly perceive potential interactions 
[2]. 
 In commenting on the many different uses of the term affordance in the design 
literature, Norman (1999) distinguished between perceived affordances in general and a 
subclass of culturally constrained perceived affordances that he called conventions [3].  
Users cannot ignore affordances because they physically constrain interactions. However, 
conventions can be ignored because the constraint is learned, rather than physical.  Thus, 
Norman suggested that there is a qualitative difference between conventions, or situations in 
which the mapping of visual cues to actions is an arbitrary choice of the designer, and 
affordances, or situations in which the mapping is a natural consequence of the physical 
world. He suggested that most computer systems are limited to a small number of built-in 
affordances (e.g., keyboard, pointing device, mouse buttons, etc.), and that these affordances 
are of little use for facilitating software application interactions.  For example, because the 
user is not physically constrained to click on a specific icon, Norman cautioned that 
designers should not conclude that an icon within a desktop metaphor affords clicking.  To 
do so would be an incorrect use of Gibson’s affordance.   
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 Although the desktop user is physically unconstrained to click on an icon or 
anywhere else within the visible screen, past experiences of the user will make the clicking 
on the icon a likely behavior.  It is this type of culturally constrained interface interaction 
(i.e., one that depends on learning) that defines a convention. Another example of a 
convention is having learned that moving a scroll bar up moves the page up while viewing 
the document. The relationship between the scroll bar and the page movement is not 
transparent until the user moves the bar and receives visual feedback [3]. According to 
Norman, “This is what the interface designer should care about: Does the user perceive that 
clicking on that object is a meaningful, useful action, with a known outcome?”(p.40). 
 Implied by Norman’s distinction between affordance and convention is that they 
should be treated differently by the designer.  Others, however, disagree with Norman’s 
conceptualization of conventions as distinct from affordances. According to McGrenere and 
Ho (2000), software application interfaces may afford specific interactions [4]. “The 
functions that are invokable by the user are the affordances in software… Norman claims that 
a scrollbar is a learned convention and implies that it is not an affordance. We disagree. The 
fact that the object affords scrolling is an affordance that is built into the software. The 
information that specifies this affordance is in fact a learned convention… [Acting on the bar 
will either move the page up or down]” (p. 6).  Additionally, McGrenere and Ho described 
how users often customize their interfaces making affordances more efficient to undertake.  
They suggested that affordances are efficient when the execution of it is rapid, comfortable, 
and reduces exertion (e.g., hot keys or short-cuts).  
 Oshlyansky, Thimbleby and Cairns (2004) noted the lack of empirical work 
associated with perceived affordances in relationship with design [5]. They were interested in 
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how perceived affordances (conventions) vary across similar cultures. To empirically 
examine a potential cultural difference, Oshlyansky et al. surveyed US and UK students. The 
participants were asked to determine the current state of a bulb (“ON” or “OFF”) based on an 
image of a light switch. The participants were not told if their responses were correct. The 
results showed that most participants from the UK reported a light switch in the down 
position as indicating that a light bulb was “ON” while most of the US participants reported a 
light switch in the down position as indicating that a light bulb was “OFF”. The study 
provided strong evidence that students from different cultures interpreted the same very 
simple interaction (i.e., move a switch up or down) in opposite ways. Thus, Oshlyansky et al. 
stressed that designers need to consider previous knowledge when designing interfaces.  
 The light switch study assessed participant knowledge without providing feedback.  
The results suggested the existence of a different convention in the US and the UK regarding 
how to interact with a light switch.  Our investigation focuses on how users act in a very 
simple situation that sometimes offers an affordance and sometimes does not. Our question is 
whether, when no affordance is available, there will be evidence of a convention. We could 
find no formal definition of a convention in the literature.  Therefore, we defined a 
convention as 80% or more of the users responding in the same way, suggesting that they 
have learned a meaningful action based on past experience. 
 We empirically examined conventions (arbitrary button-to-action mappings) and 
affordances (natural button-to-action mappings) associated with the spatial configuration of 
two buttons (or keys) on when the user was acting on directional cues.  We asked whether 
users would adopt consistent button-to-action mappings that might be the result of similar 
interface interactions within their everyday environments. Basically, the task for the user was 
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an analog of a person being asked to navigate a menu with two buttons on a controller. The 
questions concerned: 1) whether performance would reflect affordances when they were 
available, 2) whether conventions exist when affordances are not available, and 3) whether 
affordances and conventions would differ in their impact on users.   
 We explored the possibility that conventions exist within the context of a button 
pressing task. In this task two buttons were available and the participant was instructed to try 
to “move” in one of four specific directions (i.e., up, down, left, and right). We used the 
numeric keypad of a standard keyboard in which the buttons closest to the user’s body were 
slightly lower than buttons farther from the user. The spatial configuration of the buttons was 
manipulated; participants were presented with two buttons arranged vertically, horizontally, 
or diagonally.  The configurations are shown in Figure 1. We assumed that an affordance 
would be present when the spatial button configuration was congruent with the directional 
cue (affordance condition). Thus, the vertical buttons (panel A) afforded two directions (up, 
down) because one button was slightly higher than the other on the keyboard, the horizontal 
buttons (panel B) afforded two directions (left, right), and the diagonal buttons (panel C) 
afforded all four directions because the buttons were both above/below and to the side of 
each other.   
 We predicted that participants would make the afforded response when it was 
possible.  Of interest was the nature of responses when affordances were not available (i.e., 
for left/right cues with a vertical orientation of buttons and for up/down cues with a 
horizontal orientation). In these instances, individual participants could respond in one of 
two-ways.  The participant could use a consistent button-to-action mapping (e.g., a 
participant might consistently choose the right button when given the up cue and the left 
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button when given the down cue) or the participant could select buttons so that there is no 
consistent pattern.  If participants individually show consistency in their responses, then one 
can ask if there is consistency between participants in the nature of the button-to-action 
mapping. If a convention exists, then most participants should use the same consistent 
button-to-action mapping.  
                                              A.             B.               C. 
 





 The university institutional review board approved all experimental procedures. 
Thirty undergraduate volunteers (28 right handed, 14 females) were recruited to participate in 
exchange for course research credit in an introductory psychology course. Each participant 
had normal or corrected to normal vision.  
Stimuli and Apparatus 
 The trials were presented on an HP Pentium 4 Windows XP machine with a 17 inch 
monitor. On each trial, one of four directional cue words (Up, Down, Left, or Right) was 
presented centrally in size 48 Arial font.  Responses were collected through a PS/2 
keyboard’s numeric keypad. Only three pairs of keys (six buttons) were used and those keys 
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were covered with the appropriately colored stickers as is shown in Figure 2. Red stickers 
represented the diagonal configuration by covering keys 5 and 9. Blue stickers represented 
the horizontal configuration by covering keys 1 and 2. Yellow stickers represented the 
vertical configuration by covering key 3 and 6. This study was created and executed within 
E-prime experimental presentation software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., 
www.pstnet.com). 
 
Figure 2. Photograph of the three configurations of two-button pairs as implemented on the 
keyboard. 
 
 Participants were run at individual computer stations in groups of up to four.  They 
wore sound deadening earmuffs and there were dividers between computer stations so that 
participants could not see each other. 
Procedure 
 Participants faced an ambiguous situation in which they were not instructed how to 
act on the given button configuration, nor was any feedback given.  Participants were told, 
“You will be instructed to place your fingers onto the specified color. Then you will be given 
a directional cue to either move up, down, left or right. You should move in the direction 
indicated to the best of your ability given the available button configuration. Your response 
times are going to be recorded. Please, respond as accurately and as quickly as possible!” At 
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the beginning of each color block they were also given these instructions, “Please place your 
fingers on the [Red, Yellow, or Blue] buttons. Respond as accurately and as quickly as 
possible. Press one of the [Red, Yellow, or Blue] buttons to continue.” These instructions 
were intended to encourage participants to make speeded responses and to indicate that one 
button press was in fact correct for each directional cue. The instructions also ensured that 
participants’ fingers were on the correct buttons before the onset of a block of trials.  
 Spatial configuration of buttons was manipulated across blocks in a within-subject 
factorial design with three spatial configurations of the buttons (vertical, horizontal, 
diagonal) and four directional cues (up, down, left, right).  Only two buttons were available 
for response within each block. There were three blocks: vertical (yellow buttons), horizontal 
(blue buttons), and diagonal (red buttons). Block order was counterbalanced across 
participants such that there were three possible block orders (yellow, blue, red; blue, red, 
yellow; red, yellow, blue) and each participant was assigned to one order. Each block 
contained 80 trials, 20 with each directional cue. The order of cues within a block was 
randomized for each participant.   
 After the instructions for a block were presented, the participant would view a ‘Get 
Ready’ slide for 2000 msec which was directly followed by the presentation of a randomly 
selected directional cue (Up, Down, Left, or Right). Upon seeing the directional cue, the 
participant would press one of the possible buttons and the next trial would begin.  The 
procedure is illustrated in Figure 3. Participants completed the experiment in approximately 




Figure 3.  Schematic representation of the experimental procedure. The arrows indicate the 
change of displays. The three colors and button configurations represent the three blocks of 
trials. For each button configuration, a participant was presented 20 trials, each of which 
began with ‘Get Ready’ for 2000 msec and then a directional cue (up, down, left, or right) 
would appear until the participant responded with a button press. The ‘Get Ready’ slide then 
appeared, indicating the onset of the next trial. 
 
Results 
 All statistical tests used an alpha level of .05. Error bars in the figures represent the 
mean standard error. In addition to recording which button was pressed, response times were 
recorded. Responses on specific trials were excluded from the analysis if reaction times were 
less than 200 msec or greater than 2000 msec. This filtering only removed 2% (150 outliers) 
of the total data.  Three dependent variables were examined: response choice, consistency of 
choice, and response time. 
Response Choice 
 Participants were faced with a binary response decision on every trial. There were 
three different sets of binary responses (i.e., three spatial configuration of buttons) and four 
different cues. For each combination of spatial configuration and cue, we calculated the 
proportion of times that each response was chosen.  Because of the binary nature of the 
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response, a complete picture of the results can be derived from consideration of the 
proportion of trials of which one of the two responses is made. We had predicted that 
affordances were present for all cues in the diagonal condition and that an affordance was 
present only for the up/down cues with the vertical configuration and only for the left/right 
cues with the horizontal configuration. The proportions of trials on which the afforded 
response was made in these conditions are presented in solid bars in Figure 4. For the 
nonaffordance conditions (i.e., left/right cue with the vertical orientation and up/down cues 
with the horizontal orientation), the response yielding the highest group proportion is 
displayed in a patterned bar. The associated response is indicated below the bars. 
 
Figure 4.  Proportion of trials on which the group dominant response was made as a function 
of each combination of button configuration and directional cue. The response under each bar 
is the dominant choice for that combination. The solid bars represent affordance conditions 
and the patterned bars represent the nonaffordance conditions. 
 
 The first thing to notice is that the proportion of what we had assumed were afforded 
responses (solid bars) is above 0.90 for all button configurations, suggesting that we were 
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correct in our assumption that affordances were present. The second thing to notice is that 
although the proportions in the nonaffordance conditions (patterned bars) were well above 
0.50 (chance), suggesting regularity in how participants were responding in these situations, 
the proportions appeared to be lower than in the affordance conditions. The third thing to 
notice is that the difference in proportions between the affordance and nonaffordance 
conditions appears to be stronger for the up/down cues than the left/right cues.   
 A 4 (cue) x 3 (type of affordance: diagonal affordance, horizontal/vertical affordance, 
no affordance) within-subjects Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) confirmed that the apparent 
patterns were real. There was a main effect of type of affordance, F(2,58) = 9.175, MSE = 
.079, p < .001, reflecting lower proportions in the no affordance conditions, however, the 
Type of affordance x Cue interaction also was significant, F(6, 174) = 2.27, MSE = 0.026, p 
= .039. A separate ANOVA on just the up/down cues showed a main effect of type of 
affordance, F(2, 58) = 8.64, MSE = 0.086, p = .001. Comparisons among the means showed 
that performance was lower in the no affordance conditions (M = 0.746) than in the diagonal 
affordance (M = 0.925) or vertical affordance conditions (M = 0.952), which did not differ. A 
separate ANOVA on just the left/right cues showed only a marginally significant main effect 
of type of affordance, F(2, 58) = 2.64, MSE = 0.045, p = .08, indicating only a trend for 
lower performance in the nonaffordance condition.   
Consistency of Choice 
 As expected, participants were influenced by the affordances when they were 
available. They also appeared to be responding in a consistent manner in the nonaffordance 
conditions. As noted earlier, the observed consistency could reflect either a general tendency 
within each individual to make one particular response to each cue or it could reflect a 
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difference in the number of individuals consistently choosing one response with some 
individuals consistently choosing the other response. In order to determine which might be 
going on in our data, participants were placed into one of three categories for each 
combination of cue and configuration. We arbitrarily defined "consistent" responding as 
making the same response to a given cue 80-100% of the time. Thus, participants could be 
consistent in making the group dominant response (which is labeled > 79% in the figure), or 
consistent in making the opposite response (which is labeled < 21%), or they could be not 
consistent (which is labeled NC). The number of individuals falling into each category for 
each cue and configuration combination is shown in Figure 5. These categorization data 
show that even in nonaffordance conditions, individuals are performing in a consistent 
fashion.   
 
Figure 5.  Distribution of individuals falling into each of the three consistency categories as a 
function of each combination of button configuration, cue, and response. Solid bars represent 
affordance conditions and patterned bars represent nonaffordance conditions. 
 
 The data presented in Figure 5 confirm the interpretation offered for the response 
choice data. Affordances exist in the spatial configuration of the buttons. In an ambiguous 
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situation in which individuals are told to make a response indicating a movement, a button 
that matches the direction of the movement affords a response. We believe that the data also 
support the existence of conventions. A convention is present when the majority of 
participants consistently choose the same response when no affordance is present. We 
operationally defined 80% agreement over participants as indicating the existence of a 
convention.  By this definition, there is a convention in place for mapping right to an up 
response and left to a down response.  The trend for mapping up to a right response and 
down to a left response is weaker and does not constitute a convention by our definition. 
Response Time 
 Affordances reflect physical information and, therefore, responses to affordances 
might be faster than responses reflecting a convention (right/left responses in the vertical 
configuration) or a nonaffordance based consistent response (up/down responses in the 
horizontal configuration).  A difference in response time would support Norman’s (1999) 
suggestion that designers treat affordances and conventions differently.  Our final analysis 
compared the response times in the different cue and configuration combinations for those 
individuals who consistently gave the most frequent group response in the nonaffordance 
conditions. Seven participants were excluded from the analysis of response time to the 
up/down cues and four were excluded from the analysis of the right/left cues because their 
responses were inconsistent or did not follow the pattern shown by the group as a whole. The 
mean response times are shown in Figure 6. Although for both the up/down cues and the 
right/left cues, the responses were numerically faster in the affordance conditions than the 
nonaffordance conditions, the differences were not statistically reliable. A within-subjects 
ANOVA on the response times to the up/down cues with cue direction and type of 
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affordance as variables showed a significant main effect of cue direction, F (1, 22) = 8.28, 
MSE = 10,626, p < .001, in which responses to the up cue were faster (M = 560 msec) than 
responses to the down cue (M = 580 msec).  Neither the main effect of type of affordance nor 
the interaction effect were significant.   
 A similar ANOVA on the response times to the right/left cues showed no significant 
differences. We defined the responses to right/left cues in the vertical configuration as 
reflecting a convention. Although one must be cautious in drawing conclusions from null 
effects, the similar response times in the convention and affordance conditions in conjunction 
with the fact that the response times were rather quick, suggests that the choices in both cases 
were made quickly without much conscious effort. 
 
 
Figure 6.  Response time for participants making the group dominant response as a function 
of each combination of type of affordance and directional cue.  The response under each bar 
is the dominant choice for that combination. The solid bars represent affordance conditions 
and the patterned bars represents the nonaffordance conditions.  Seven participants were 
omitted from the analysis of the up/down cues and four participants were omitted from the 
analysis of the left/right cues. 
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Discussion 
 We explored the influence of affordances and conventions, which reflect previous 
knowledge, on a task in which participants made a speeded response to “move” in a specific 
direction using two buttons at different spatial configurations. The experiment was designed 
to answer several questions. One question was whether participants would use an affordance 
when it was available. The answer is yes.  Each button configuration had at least one pair of 
affordances and in each case, the afforded response was the one made most consistently by 
participants. We note that performance with the diagonal configuration was just as high for 
all four directional cues as it was when the buttons only afforded two directions (up and 
down or left and right).  Such data indicate that the diagonal configuration is an optimal 
button configuration to convey four directions.   
 In addition to showing that participants acted on the provided spatial affordances, the 
data reflected the fact that most participants’ button-to-action mappings were consistent. It is 
likely that this consistency arose from  logical constraints imposed by the binary task. 
Because the four directions consisted of pairs of opposites, a logical constraint emerges when 
a participant selects one button to use in responding to one half of the pair, then the other 
button should logically be used for the other half of the pair.  So, for example, when a 
participant chooses the top button of the vertical button set in response to right directional 
cue, by logic the bottom button should be used for left. In addition to the within-subject 
consistency in responses, we found consistency within the group.  That is, most participants 
chose the same button to reflect the same cues. These data strongly suggest that the actions 
reflected learning that may have resulted from similar experiences interacting with common 
technologies.    
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 Finding no guidelines in the literature as to how much within-group consistency is 
needed to define the existence of a convention, we arbitrarily used an 80% criterion.  
Response to only one of two spatial configurations of buttons satisfied this criterion for the 
existence of a convention in the nonaffordance conditions – the vertical button configuration. 
Given the directional cue to move right, the conventional response was to press the top 
button when using the vertical button configuration. We conjecture that this conventional 
mapping may be a reflection of common usage. For example, in US automobiles, the turn 
signal is typically to the left of the steering wheel and is designed so that an up action signals 
a right turn and a down action signals a left turn. Experience driving leads to an association 
in long-term memory between the directions and the actions. Figure 7 illustrates another 
instance of this strong nonaffordance mapping (i.e., this convention) within a remote control 
interface design (see Figure 7). Thus, previous experience with button-to-action mappings 
like this could explain the existence of our convention. 
 
Figure 7. Example of a remote control device using a two-button configuration for four 
directions.  Notice that the mapping of direction to the button configurations is congruent 
with our results. 
 
Basically, the idea is that based on such experiences, when faced with the ambiguous 
situation of pressing one of two vertically arranged buttons to indicate left, the participant 
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“knows” that the appropriate answer is to press the down button. The nonaffordance 
conditions associated with the horizontal button configuration reflected high within-group 
agreement, but the agreement was not sufficiently strong for us to conclude that a convention 
was in place. The lower within group agreement may reflect either that competing mappings 
exist in daily activities or that the mapping is not common.   
 The message for designers from our data is that users are far from being blank slates. 
As noted by Vyas, Chisalita, and Van der Veer (2006), “During the technology use, users 
continuously interpret and reconstruct the meanings related to the technology, …” (p. 93) [6].  
In even simple actions like button pressing, they are biased to prefer one of two binary 
responses. In some situations, the bias may be widespread, indicating the presence of a 
convention. Designers need to know the nature of conventions that might have an impact on 
their designs. In other situations, the bias may be less pervasive, but even then each 
individual may have a bias; even if users are not following a convention, they may still be 
acting consistently.  In other words, if users are performing poorly on a design that uses 
popular conventions it could be a result of their following a minority consistent strategy. 
Regardless, when users act according to a consistent strategy, that strategy may have been 
previously learned and could therefore be very difficult to retrain. In addition, violating the 
users’ previous knowledge could cause accidents [7]. Finally, we note that if conventions are 
not stable across device interactions, it could result in a continuous battle between interface 
designs leading to negative transfer for both designs (reflected by numerous errors for both 
designs). Therefore, it is important to know the users’ current understanding of any 
conventions in place for there to be successful design outcomes.  
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 As already noted, our prediction that diagonally offsetting the buttons would produce 
a situation in which there was an affordance for all four directions was supported. No 
difference was found between the diagonal configuration and any of the other affordances 
conditions. Thus, according to Fitt’s Law, the diagonal button configuration is the best design 
choice for moving in the direction of up, down, left, and right. In spite of this, we do 
recognize that this is only optimal when only one of the directions is possible at a time (i.e., 
down/up or left/right). Another unique action would have to be included in order to 
discriminate between user’s wanting to move up rather than right or vice versa.   
 In summary, we have demonstrated in a simple interaction that conventions may 
exist. We would like to stress the importance of understanding the users’ previous 
experiences when there is the possibility of a convention based interaction. Ignoring the 
users’ previous knowledge may result in repeated errors. Further, the previous experience 
may have developed into a convention. Research has shown that such highly practiced 
consistent mapping situations are difficult to retain because they are no longer under 
conscious control [8].  
 Our results do not provide evidence that affordances allow faster responses, at least in 
the simple task we examined. Prior learning of a button-to-response mapping removes 
ambiguity from the interaction. The learned mapping is stored in long-term memory, so when 
a similar instance of interaction arises again, relevant information in long-term memory 
becomes active and this leads to more efficient processing of the situation and the response.  
Neisser (1976) referred to this as the perceptual cycle in which past experience drives current 
perception [9]. Our data suggest that even though the designer may not see a visually 
constrained interface, the user may.  When an affordance is present, the designer is likely to 
58 
view the situation just as the user does.  When an affordance is absent, the extent to which 
the designer and user view the situation in a similar fashion will depend on the extent to 
which they have had similar past interactions that lead to a similar perceptual cycle.  In these 
situations, the designer needs to consider the possibility that a convention exists, a point also 
made by Oshlyansky, Thimbleby and Cairns (2004).  
 From a user-centered design perspective, there are two major reasons for recognizing 
the concurrent conventions in play. First, requiring the user to repeatedly learn new interface 
conventions consumes the users’ working memory which, in return, slows their information 
processing system.  Good interface design rapidly becomes pervasive in supporting the users’ 
task goals (i.e., success in the interaction does not need to itself become a goal). Second, 
there may be operating conditions (e.g., non-optimal arousal, working memory is filled with 
primary task calculations, etc.) in which a user does not have full access to working memory. 
Under such conditions, an interaction may be slow or fail.  Thus, a good interface design 
should take advantage of knowledge stored in long-term memory so that the user’s 
interaction with the interface is more effortless and more successful.  In short, considering 
users’ conventions during the design process will lead to increased usability by minimizing 
interference with existing applications.    
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CHAPTER 4. EXAMINING WORKING MEMORY LOAD AND 
CONGRUENCY EFFECTS ON AFFORDANCES AND CONVENTIONS 
 
This article was prepared for the International Journal of Human-Computer Studies. 
Jeremiah D. Still & Veronica J. Dark 
Abstract  
It has been debated whether designers should draw a distinction between perceptual 
affordances and cultural conventions. There is little behavioral evidence for either side of the 
debate. We investigated the cognitive attributes of acting on affordances and conventions 
through manipulating working memory load and expected button-to-action mapping 
congruency. The findings suggest both sides of the debate are correct. There was a behavioral 
difference between acting on affordances and acting on conventions. However, like 
affordances, learned conventions were found to structure responses towards expected actions. 
Therefore, designers ought to employ perceptual affordances when possible and when not 
feasible they ought to reuse established conventions. Additionally, evidence is presented that 
violating expected affordance-based and convention-based button-to-action mappings caused 
a similar performance cost. We believe that after the initial learning period, conventions play 




A question of concern to designers is why certain interfaces lead users to effortless 
interactions and others to frustration. According to Norman (1988), perceived affordances 
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facilitate this effortless experience through implicit guidance towards a design’s available 
actions. The concept of perceptual affordance was originally introduced by J. J. Gibson 
(1979), who coined the term affordance to refer to the function an object clearly offers within 
an environment. In natural environments, affordances emerge from physical constraints 
during user and interface interactions (e.g., a key on the keyboard affords pressing). A 
designer is able to take advantage of affordances within in a virtual world by maintaining 
naturally occurring characteristics within that world (e.g., including 3-D cues, like shadows, 
on a virtual keyboard).  However, it is often the case that characteristics associated with a 
perceptual affordance are not available within an interface. When perceptual affordances are 
not available, designers are required to use conventions. 
Conventions are initially arbitrary mappings between an action and a function within 
an interface that become relatively common within a group (Norman, 1999). A point of 
contention in the affordance literature is whether or not designers should be concerned with 
the distinction between perceptual affordances, which are presumed to be unlearned, and 
conventions, which are presumed to be learned (McGrenere & Ho, 2000; Norman, 1999; 
Oshlyansky, Thimbleby & Cairns, 2004). Some authors claim that perceptual affordances are 
unique and not comparable to conventions. However, there have been few empirical studies 
contrasting affordance and convention interactions (see Still & Dark, 2008, for one such 
study). We believe that after the initial learning period, conventions play a critical role in the 
perception of a design’s available actions, just as do perceptual affordances.  
Conventions usually develop within a design that is constrained in such a way that 
embedding a perceptual affordance is impractical or impossible. It is reasonable to assume 
that in the absence of perceptual affordances, users would learn conventions to resolve 
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interaction ambiguities. Basically, a convention is an interaction that emerges when multiple 
users each form a learned association between an action and function in the absence of a 
perceptual affordance. The associative strength between the action and function will vary as a 
function of interaction frequency. When the association begins to influence user 
expectations, it can be considered a convention.  In fact, in our view, the associative strength 
between an action and function may grow so strong that it becomes a perceived affordance.  
For example, clicking an underlined-word hyperlink affords the presentation of another web 
page.  Once the user learns the interface convention through enough interaction instances, the 
association between action and function becomes expected. The user in the hyperlink 
example strongly expects that underlined items on a new web page will be clickable 
hyperlinks.        
Designers employ perceptual affordances because the available actions appear to be 
immediately perceived by the user.  In other words, a user acting on an affordance does not 
have to consciously think about what action is available; it is just apparent.  In cognitive 
terms, the action is directly available without mental effort; it is available without the need to 
expend limited-capacity, working memory resources.  The current study was designed to 
examine the effect of variations in working memory resources on actions associated with 
affordances and conventions.  Participants engaged in button interactions while holding 
varying amounts of information in working memory.  Examining the effect of working 
memory load on affordance-based and convention-based interactions will provide insight into 
the cognitive attributes of perceptual affordances and conventions.  
Designers respect perceptual affordances within their designs and do not violate 
affordance-based visual cue-to-action mappings because they know that design interactions 
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would suffer.  Less is known about the cost to performance of violating convention-based 
expectancies in comparison to the cost of violating affordance-based expectancies. Knowing 
whether or not there are differences will inform designers about whether they need to 
consider the impact of violating conventions as much as they consider the impact of violating 
affordances.  
Another question examined in this article is the ease with which participants are able 
to overcome interference when they engage in interactions that violate affordance-based 
expectancies versus convention-based expectancies. Learning new information often requires 
deliberate processing, which requires limited working memory resources. In this article, we 
compared accuracy and response time of interactions related to affordances and conventions 
when both working memory load and expectancy were manipulated within a spatial target 
selection task. Our goal was to gain insight into the cognitive attributes of using a perceptual 
affordance in contrast to a learned convention within a design (Visser, 2006).  
Affordances vs. Conventions 
The affordance versus convention debate is fueled by the introduction of virtual 
interfaces that lack the traditional physical characteristics of affordances. Such virtual 
interfaces have led to the question of whether the term affordance should be reserved for only 
physical objects that provide a natural mapping between their design and available functions. 
According to Norman (1999), the virtual desktop does not physically constrain the user’s 
interaction to specific actions, like clicking only on ‘available’ buttons. He stressed that 
designers should refer to the learned constraint of actions (e.g., clicking on virtual buttons) as 
conventions and that the term affordance should be reserved for naturally occurring physical 
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constraints like clicking a mouse button. Norman’s distinction suggests a qualitative 
difference for designers between conventions and affordances.  
In contrast, others believe that the term affordance may be adopted within the context 
of virtual interfaces. According to McGrenere and Ho (2000), affordances in the software are 
learned by users and affordance-based and convention-based interactions are not qualitatively 
different.  “The functions that are invokable by the user are the affordances in software… 
Norman claims that a scrollbar is a learned convention and implies that it is not an 
affordance. We disagree. The fact that the object affords scrolling is an affordance that is 
built into the software. The information that specifies this affordance is in fact a learned 
convention… [Acting on the bar will either move the page up or down]” (p. 6) It is clear by 
these authors’ statements that they believe conventions, once learned, afford actions.   
On the one hand, if McGrenere and Ho (2000) are right, there may be little difference 
between interactions based on physical affordances and those based on conventions. On the 
other hand, if Norman (1999) is correct, there may be important differences between how 
interactions based on affordances and conventions are processed by users. We intend to shed 
some light on whether or not there is behavioral support for the distinction between these two 
design concepts.  
One can ask the question whether conventions, once learned, are behaviorally the 
same as affordances. We first investigated this question using a simple button task (Still & 
Dark, 2008). In this task, user responses were constrained to two buttons, but users were 
required to respond to four different direction words defining two different direction pairs: up 
- down and left - right. Our research goal was to capture current expectations of button-to-
action mappings, so feedback on button pressing was not given. The spatial layout of the 
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buttons was such that each spatial layout "afforded" responses that matched either one or 
both of the direction pairs. The vertical configuration "afforded" actions to the up-down pair.  
The horizontal configuration "afforded" actions to the left-right pair.  The diagonal 
configuration "afforded" actions to both pairs (i.e., to all four directions). For example, given 
the vertical button configuration, the top button afforded the direction up and the bottom 
button afforded the direction down but there were no affordances for left and right.  
We found that even when no affordance was available, participants demonstrated 
consistent button-to-action responses.  There were two types of consistency.  First, individual 
participants were logically consistent within a direction pair in that they mapped one button 
to one direction within each pair.  So, left was mapped to one button and right was mapped to 
the other.  Similarly, up was mapped to one button and down was mapped to the other.  
Second, the nature of this mapping was consistent across participants.  The mappings for the 
affordance conditions were as expected (e.g., the left button was mapped to left) and were the 
same for almost all the participants.  Of more interest was the finding that there was 
consistency across participants in how the nonaffordance conditions were mapped.  Over 
80% of the participants mapped the top button in the vertical configuration to the direction 
right (and the bottom button to the direction left), and 70% of the participants mapped the 
right button in the horizontal configuration, to the direction up (and the left button to the 
direction down).  
In our simple button experiment, no difference in participant performance (response 
agreement, response consistency, response time) was found between conventions and 
affordances (Still & Dark, 2008). It appeared that the vertical top button afforded moving 
right as much as it afforded moving up. From these results we suggested that affordances and 
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conventions may be behaviorally indistinguishable. Thus, from a design standpoint, the 
results showed that although the decision to represent four directions with either a horizontal 
or vertical button configuration would seem to be arbitrary, one choice better fit the users’ 
current expectations.  
Overview of Experiments 1 & 2  
In this paper, we report data collected in one session from one set of participants, but 
participants engaged in two versions of a button-pressing task, one with and one without 
feedback.  We will describe these two different participant experiences as Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2.   
Still and Dark (2008) was one of the few studies to empirically compare performance 
with affordances and conventions. In Experiment 1, we replicated the basic procedure of this 
earlier study to see whether the results would replicate. That is, we wanted to test whether 
participants began the experiment with direction-to-action mapping expectancies (e.g., top 
mapped to right) already in place. As before, participants faced an ambiguous situation in 
which they were not instructed how to act on the given button configuration, nor was any 
feedback given. To foreshadow the results, we did replicate our original findings, supporting 
the existence of conventions. In Experiment 2, we explored the effect of working memory 
load and mapping congruency on participants’ ability to perform actions based on 
affordances and conventions. We achieved this by modifying our simple button pressing 
experiment so that there was a correct answer and feedback was given. To foreshadow the 




Still and Dark (2008) demonstrated that a convention existed in a simple button-
pressing situation. For example, as already described, when asked to press a top or bottom 
button in response to the direction cue "right", 80% of participants pressed the top button.  
Participants in the current experiment were faced with the same button task employed by Still 
and Dark, however, for practical reasons the number of trials for each direction cue under 
each button configuration was reduced from 60 to 12.  Our intent was to capture participants’ 
extant expectations concerning button-to-action mappings.   
Method 
 Participants 
Twenty-seven undergraduate volunteers participated1 in exchange for course research 
credit (females = 16). Only one participant reported being left hand dominant. All 
participants reported having normal or corrected to normal vision.        
     Stimuli and Apparatus  
The experiment was presented on an HP Pentium 4 Windows XP machine with a 17 
inch monitor. Responses were collected through a PS/2 keyboard’s numeric keypad. Only 
three pairs of keys (six buttons) were used and these keys were covered with colored stickers. 
The same experimental setup used in the Still and Dark (2008) button pressing experiment 
                                                 
1
 Data from an additional three participants were excluded from all analyses because their 
target selection performance was two standard deviations under mean participant 




was used. Red stickers covered keys five and nine representing the diagonal configuration. 
Blue stickers covered keys one and two representing the horizontal configuration. Yellow 
stickers covered keys three and six representing the vertical configuration. The stimuli were 
created and executed within E-prime experimental presentation software (Psychology 
Software Tools, Inc., www.pstnet.com).   
Participants were run at individual computer stations in groups of up to three.  They wore 
sound deadening earmuffs and there were dividers between computer stations preventing the 
participants from viewing or hearing each other. 
Procedure  
Participants were presented with an ambiguous situation in which they were not provided 
with any feedback on their button pressing actions. Participants were instructed at the 
beginning of each block to place their fingers on the appropriate buttons (i.e., vertical, 
horizontal or diagonal). Further, they were told to use these buttons to move in the cued 
direction to the best of their ability given the current spatial button configuration. Participants 
were randomly presented a directional cue: up, down, left or right that remained on the 
screen until a response was given (see Figure 1). They were encouraged to respond as 
accurately and as quickly as possible. These instructions were intended to encourage 
participants to make speeded responses and to indicate that one button press was in fact 
correct for each directional cue. Participants acted on 12 directional cues per button 
configuration block, yielding a total of 36 trials. Block order was counterbalanced across 




Figure 1.  Schematic of the experimental procedure. The arrows indicate the flow of 
displays. The three colors and button configurations represent the three blocks of trials. For 
each button configuration, a participant was presented 12 trials, each of which began with 
‘Get Ready’ for 2000 msec and then a directional cue (up, down, left, or right). The cue was 
displayed until the participant responded with a button press. The ‘Get Ready’ slide then 
appeared, indicating the start of the next trial. 
 
Results & Discussion 
Examination of which button was chosen provided a measure of the participants’ 
expectations of button-to-action (direction) mappings given vertical, horizontal and diagonal 
button configurations. The mappings were obtained without feedback and therefore should 
reflect prior expectancies. We classified the response patterns for each direction pair 
(up/down, left/right) with each button configuration into one of three button-to-action types 
(congruent, inconsistent or incongruent) based on our previous findings (Still & Dark, 2008).  
The 12 trials with each configuration were first examined for logical consistency.  Logically 
consistent responses were those in which one button was mapped to each of the opposite 
directions in a pair (i.e., one button was associated with up and the other with down; one 
button was associated with left and the other with right.)  For a given configuration, the 
responses were considered logically consistent if at least two out of three responses for each 
direction in a direction-pair were mapped to the same button and logically inconsistent 
otherwise. The logically consistent sets of responses were further classified as congruent if 
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the button-to-action mapping matched the majority pattern found in the earlier work and 
incongruent if the mapping matched the opposite pattern.  Table 1 displays the number of 
participants falling into each category as a function of button spatial configuration, direction 
pair, and button-to-action mapping.  
Table 1.  Number of participants in each category as a function of button configuration and 
direction pair. 
 
 Spatial Button Configuration and Direction Pair 













Congruent 26 20 26 17 25 26 
Incongruent 0 4 1 8 1 0 
Inconsistent 1 3 0 2 1 1 
 
The affordance button-to-action mappings were highly agreed upon across button 
configurations. This is probably due to the perceptual matching between up/down or 
left/right and the physical buttons’ spatial locations. Although the nonaffordance conditions 
lacked the aid of perceptual cues, there still was a high level of participant agreement. The 
fact that very few people showed an inconsistent response pattern indicates that there was a 
logical constraint influencing participants’ button-to-action mappings, just as was found in 
our previous work (Still & Dark, 2008). Also, as shown by Still and Dark, a large majority of 
participants agreed that the top vertical button should be mapped for moving right and the 
bottom button for moving left and a smaller majority of participants agreed that for left 
horizontal button should used for moving down and the right button for moving up.  
In both our current and previous results, participants appear to have expectancies 
about which button to press in the nonaffordance conditions and the expectancy across 
participants is stronger for the vertical than the horizontal button configurations.  In Still and 
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Dark (2008), we arbitrarily chose 80% agreement across participants as the definition of a 
convention.  But, just as in the earlier work, we found that even with the horizontal 
configuration, the choice was not arbitrary. Clearly, participants are not responding randomly 
in the nonaffordance conditions with either configuration.  We now believe that choosing an 
arbitrary point, like 80% agreement, to define a convention is establishing a dichotomy when 
none exists.  The expectancies in this task are quantitatively rather than qualitatively 
different.  Therefore, in the remainder of this article, we will treat all nonaffordance 
conditions as conventions.  When we want to draw attention to the fact that the 
nonaffordance expectancies associated with the horizontal configuration are weaker than 
those associated with the vertical configuration, we will refer to those weaker expectancies as 
a "bias".  Figure 2 summarizes the empirical findings   
 
Figure 2. A visual representation of button-to-action empirical findings. The squares 
represent the button spatial configuration and the arrows show the mapping of the buttons to 
the directions.   
 
We hypothesize that conventions and biases within a user group are indicative of the 
differing amounts of interaction regularity experienced by the user.  The results suggest that 
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users may have learned that across numerous devices the top buttons are typically associated 
with moving right within vertically configured buttons, thus, leading to existence of a strong 
convention at the group level. A group bias could arise for the horizontally configured 
buttons if most devices map the right button with moving up but a sizable proportion also 
map the right button with moving down. We predict that the effect of multiple interactions 
with devices in this case will differentially influence individual users’ button performance 
with some users adopting the more frequent interaction mapping and others adopting the less 
frequent interaction mapping. Thus, we suggest that strong conventions are associated with 
consistent learning episodes across devices and that those episodes lead to strong associations 
between button and action mappings. In contrast, biases are associated with more varied 




As the results of Still and Dark (2008) and Experiment 1 suggest, it is important for 
designers to understand the users’ previous experiences because that knowledge determines 
participants’ expectancies and which interactions will be most effective. For example, if a 
new interface requires responses that conflict with an already learned convention, users may 
be more likely to make repeated errors. The repeated errors would be the result of responses 
being directly shaped by long-term memory structures built during past interactions (see 
Chapter 2). Research has shown that such highly practiced consistent mapping situations are 
difficult to retrain because they are automatic and no longer under conscious control 
(Besnard, & Cacitti, 2005; Moors, & Houwer, 2006; Norman, & Shallice, 1986; Shiffrin, & 
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Schneider, 1977). To overcome the previously learned interaction requires monitoring and 
rebuilding of memory structures through controlled processing. Controlled processing 
requires working memory resources. 
The Role of Working Memory 
Users only have access to a limited amount of working memory resources and the 
availability of these resources is critical for minimizing cognitive effort and task errors 
(Reason, 1990). Working memory is most often described as a temporary storage usually 
discussed as a mental workspace for conscious processing (Baddeley, 1992). Although 
working memory and long-term memory have been discussed as two separate systems, it is 
commonly assumed that the two systems interact (e.g., Baddeley, 2002). Long-term memory 
structures mold current representations being operated on within working memory. Another 
conceptualization of working memory was provided by Cowan (1988), who suggested that 
short term storage is actually highly activated regions within long-term memory. By this 
view the representations available to working memory depend on knowledge and structures 
already present in long-term memory.  
An understanding of working memory and its role in interactions has practical 
implications for design. For example, novice chop stick users must spend a lot of working 
memory resources towards correctly operating chop sticks when eating noodles. That is, the 
user needs to focus on how to hold the chop sticks in a way that gathers noodles. However, 
an expert user can eat quickly while reserving working memory resources to carry on a 
discussion (Allport, Antonis, & Reynolds, 1972). These extra working memory resources are 
available to the expert user because the procedure of how to use chop sticks has already been 
learned and stored in long-term memory, making that procedure directly accessible without 
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consuming limited working memory resources. Therefore if one were designing a product 
with an interface that had similar functionality to chop sticks, one might want to consider 
whether or not the user already has that knowledge in memory and how that knowledge will 
affect the user’s interpretation of the design.  
According to Baddeley (1986), working memory includes both verbal and visual 
systems.  There is a phonological loop for rehearsing verbal information and a visuospatial 
sketchpad where visual images are briefly stored. Both subsystems are controlled by the 
central executive.  Baddeley’s model of working memory has been examined under an array 
of dual task methodologies in which researchers examine the effects of completing two tasks 
simultaneously (e.g., Logie, Zucco, & Baddeley, 1990). The two tasks may or may not draw 
on common limited working memory resources. If a primary task is effortful and consumes 
working memory resources, the secondary task will only be affected if it consumes similar 
limited resources.  
If affordances and conventions are behaviorally different, they also may be affected 
differently by availability of working memory resources. Due to the perceptual nature of 
affordances, they are most likely automatic and should require few working memory 
resources. A convention may or may not still be a controlled process that requires working 
memory resources. Thus, there may be design implications if working memory load affects 
affordances and conventions differently. Experiment 2 was designed to examine whether 
working memory load interferes with convention-based interactions and not with affordance-
based interactions. Answering this question would provide critical insight into cognitive 
differences between the two interaction types.   
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The Role of Congruency 
As mentioned earlier, consistency plays a critical role in forming stable long-term 
memory structures that support automatic processing of an interface leading to effortless 
perception of a design’s functions. Such automatic processes, or skills, are often used by 
experts to quickly find solutions to complex problems. Thus, technology experts develop 
skills that depend on consistent interface interactions. Like expert chop stick users, 
technology experts have interaction patterns that are stored in long-term memory. These 
patterns are directly accessible without consuming many limited working memory resources 
(Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995). Due to working memory’s limited capacity, humans must 
depend on recognition of patterns to perform multiple tasks more efficiently.  
We know from previous research that when expectations are violated, interactions 
become slower and more effortful. The incongruent mapping of previous interaction 
knowledge to a current and different interaction is known as negative transfer (Besnard & 
Cacitti, 2005). When an interface uses familiar visual features, but those features have a new 
function, it creates a potentially dangerous situation (Norman, 1983). In a negative transfer 
situation, users expect a learned outcome based on their actions and yet an unexpected 
outcome occurs. This incongruent mapping between a user’s actions and the interface 
response requires additional working memory resources as the interaction is now required to 
be consciously monitored. Thus, when working memory resources are limited, dealing with 
incongruency may be especially difficult.  One of the questions examined in Experiment 2 
was what is the cost of violating the expectancies in affordance-based and convention-based 
interactions (as operationalized by incongruent mappings) and how does the cost compare?   
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In Experiment 2, participants performed a target selection task while maintaining 
information in working memory.  Participants were asked to remember two (low load) or 
four letters (high load) and the locations of those letters within a three by three grid and then 
to engage in four interaction, or movement, trials in which they “moved” towards the target 
by hitting one of two buttons.  After four movement trials, participants were presented a 
single letter and asked for its location within the grid. This working memory task required 
participants to combine information from both verbal and spatial working memory and 
therefore should also have used resources from the central executive (Baddeley, 2007; Fuster, 
2002; Wickens, 2002). The working memory task was designed so that under high load fewer 
working memory resources would be available for any other processing than under low load.   
The button pressing task used Experiment 2 was very different from that used in 
Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, there was a correct response and the response produced a 
visible action in which a cursor moved in a prescribed button-to-action mapping, providing 
visual feedback. Only the vertical and horizontal spatial button configurations were 
employed and the mappings were either congruent or incongruent (i.e., inverted) given the 
movement type. For example, an incongruently mapped vertical affordance movement would 
associate the top button with moving down and the bottom button with moving up. We 
assumed that the congruent mappings would fit user expectancies and incongruent mappings 
would violate user expectancies. 
Participants were encouraged to learn from their interactions so that they could be as 
fast and as accurate as possible within each mapping block. There were 40 movement trials 
in each block and we examined performance as a function of practice in order to determine 
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whether practice differentially affected responses based on conventions and affordances 
under manipulations of working memory and button-to-action mapping congruency.  
Method 
 Participants 
 The same 27 participants from Experiment 1 also participated in Experiment 2.    
      Stimuli and Apparatus  
The equipment and software were the same as used in Experiment 1 except that only 
two pairs of keys (four buttons) were used. The horizontal configuration consisted of keys 
one and two covered in blue stickers. The vertical configuration consisted of keys three and 
six covered in yellow stickers. As in Experiment 1, participants were run at individual 
computer stations in groups of up to three. They wore sound deadening earmuffs and there 
were dividers between computer stations preventing the participants from viewing or hearing 
each other. 
Experimental Design  
 The experiment employed a within-subject factorial design with two button-to-action 
mappings (congruent or incongruent with expectations), two different working memory loads 
(two or four letters), and two button configurations (vertical or horizontal). Thus there were 
eight different blocks.  Block order was randomly determined for each participant.    
Each block contained 10 working memory trials and embedded within each working 
memory trial were 4 movement trials in which one target and three distractors were 
presented. The task was to move to the target’s spatial location. The order of movement trials 
within a working memory trial was random without replacement. Thus, there were 40 
movement trials in each block, half reflecting affordance-based movements and half 
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reflecting convention-based movements. Figure 3 illustrates the displays comprising a 
working memory trial with the embedded movement trials. 
 
Figure 3. Schematic representation of a working memory trial, which included four 
embedded movement trials. The arrow represents passage of time. Each trial began with the 
memory display (4000 msec) in which two or four letters were presented, one at each of 9 
possible locations. Next, the display prompted the participant to “Get Ready!!” (1000 msec) 
then a target and distractor array appeared until the participant responded with a button press 
that caused the cursor to move to a target or distractor, depending on the mapping in place.  
The cursor stayed at the associated location for 300 msec, providing visual feedback. Four 
movement trials occurred, one with the target at each possible location, followed by the letter 
probe. Participants pressed a letter key indicating the location the letter probe had occupied 
in the memory display. A break and reminder of the instructions occurred at the end of each 
working memory trial. Ten consecutive working memory trials under each set of button-to-
action mappings comprised a block. After completing a block participants were made aware 
that a new block was about to begin and they were encouraged to take a break. 
79 
The first set of four movement trials in a block served as the "instructional set" 
because feedback on that block indicated that block’s button-to-action mappings. The 
remaining 9 blocks were divided into thirds to assess practice effects.  
Procedure 
Participants received general instructions explaining the nature of the working 
memory task and the movement task.  For the working memory task, two or four letters were 
presented with each letter in a randomly chosen cell in a 3 x 3 grid outlined on the screen.  
The display lasted 4000 msec.  Participants were told that they needed to remember which 
letter occurred in which locations because their memory for this information would be tested 
after four movement trials. For the test, one of the letters was randomly selected and was 
presented at the top of the screen and participants were asked to specify in which position in 
a three by three grid the letter had appeared at the beginning of the working memory trial. 
Participants entered the response by using the numeric keys on the upper row of the 
keyboard. Only accuracy was stressed for the working memory task. Working memory load 
was manipulated between blocks, so all 10 working memory trials within a block were either 
load 2 or load 4.  
For the movement task, participants were told that they would see a display with a 
target ‘x’ and three distractor circles.  Their task was to move the cursor in the direction of 
the ‘x’ to the best of their ability given the two available buttons. The cursor the participant 
moved was two black lines vertically arranged.  The cursor appeared in the middle of the 
screen along with the words ‘Get Ready’ for 1000 msec prior to onset of the target display.  
Upon seeing the target and distractors array, the participants pressed one of the two buttons 
and that choice caused the cursor to move in a prescribed way (i.e., the cursor moved to the 
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location associated with that response for the current block). As soon as the participant made 
a response, the cursor moved to the location associated with that response for the current 
block. The cursor remained at the chosen location for 300 msec. As already noted, 
participants were instructed to be as quick and as accurate as possible on this task.  
Participants completed four consecutive movement trials before the working memory 
test. During these four trials, the location of the target was random with the constraint that it 
occurred once at each location (Top, Bottom, Left, or Right of the cursor). The button-to-
action mappings were either congruent or incongruent with previously identified affordances 
and conventions/biases. The button-to-action mapping varied across blocks (i.e., they 
changed after each 10 working memory trials). Participants were not informed of what the 
button-to-action mapping was, but they were told at the beginning of each block that a new 
mapping was in place. Participants needed to use the visual feedback relating their button 
press to cursor movement on the first set of movement trials to infer the current button-to-
action mapping.  Thus, the first set of four movement trials served as instructions for the 
block. Table 2 summarizes the four button-to-action mappings that were used.     
Table 2. Description of all the button-to-action mappings examined in Experiment 2. The 
arrows represent the cursor’s directional movement when the associated spatial button was 
pressed. 
 
 Congruent Incongruent 
Spatial Button 






















Before each block and after each working memory trial, participants were given an 
opportunity to rest. They were presented a display in which they were reminded to respond as 
accurately and as quickly as possible for the next movement trials.  The display also 
instructed them to place their fingers on the appropriate buttons (i.e., vertical or horizontal), 
ensuring that participants’ fingers were on the correct buttons. Importantly, at the beginning 
of each block, participants were instructed that a new block was about to begin. This warning 
indicated that the underlying button-to-action mappings or working memory load or both 
would change.   
Across blocks, the button-to-action mappings were manipulated to investigate the 
impact on user performance of a design that either is congruent with users’ current 
knowledge or that violates their current knowledge (incongruent). Working memory load 
also was varied across blocks. The response time and accuracy of all responses were 
collected.  
 Within a block of trials participants interacted with an affordance and a convention 
depending on the target’s location and the buttons being used. For example, given the vertical 
button configuration and the four possible locations in which a target may appear, using the 
buttons to move up/down would be considered an affordance, but moving left/right would be 
considered a convention. Thus, half of the trials within a block had participants act on an 
affordance and half on a convention. Moving the cursor up/down and left/right represented 
different movement types (i.e., affordance or convention) within each block. For each type, 
the mapping could be congruent (e.g., left button for left) or incongruent (e.g., left button for 
right). The entire experiment took approximately 30 minutes including instructions and 
debriefing.   
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Results & Discussion 
Any response with a latency of less than 150 msec was omitted from all analyses 
(both accuracy and response time); this removed 147 data points out of 8,460 (i.e., 2% of the 
total data). Further, response time outliers were identified at the individual subject level by 
computing a ceiling at 2.5 standard deviations above the mean. Separate outlier cutoffs were 
calculated for the congruent and incongruent distributions because response times were much 
faster with congruent mappings.  Any response time that exceeded the ceiling for a subject 
was replaced with the ceiling value. These replacements occurred for 202 data points out of 
8,460 (i.e., 2% of the total data).  
There were three dependent measures across two tasks: working memory accuracy, 
target selection accuracy, and target selection response time.  All statistical tests used an 
alpha level of .05 and all error bars in the figures represent the standard error of the mean.  
Working Memory Task 
A 2 x 2 x 2 repeated-measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with the variables 
button spatial configuration (vertical or horizontal), working memory load (two or four 
letters), and mapping congruency (congruent or incongruent with expectations) was 
conducted. As expected, the accuracy on the working memory task for remembering two 
letters (M = .75, SE = .03) was significantly higher than for remembering four letters (M = 
.69, SE = .04), F(1, 26)  = 5.35, p = .029. Further, performance on the working memory task 
was well above chance, which was .11, or 1 out 9 possible letter locations. The main effect of 
mapping congruency was significant, F(1, 26) = 10.53, p = .003, showing that working 
memory task performance was higher under congruent (M = .77, SE = .03) as compared to 
incongruent button-to-action mappings (M = .68, SE = .04).  No other main effects or 
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interactions were significant. These results suggest that participants were doing the working 
memory task and that they should have had more resources available in the low working 
memory blocks. They also suggest that the incongruent mapping conditions were more 
difficult than the congruent mapping conditions.        
 Movement Trials 
Four movement trials were embedded within each of 10 working memory trials in a 
block. The movement trials embedded within the first working memory trial in each block 
were treated as instruction trials and were not analyzed. Interactions on these trials are 
qualitatively different from interactions in the other trials because during these trials the 
participant had to determine by trial and error the nature of the underlying button-to-action 
mapping. Thus, the feedback provided during the first four movement trials served as button-
to-action mapping instructions for a given block. The movement trials within the remaining 
nine working memory trials were grouped into thirds in order to examine practice effects. 
The first third was comprised of the 12 movement trials embedded in working memory trials 
2-4, the middle third was comprised of the 12 movement trials embedded in working 
memory trials 5-7, and the final third was comprised of the 12 movement trials embedded in 
working memory trials 8-10.   
Target Selection Accuracy  
A 3 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with the variables practice (thirds), 
movement type (affordance or convention), button spatial configuration (vertical or 
horizontal), working memory load (two or four letters), and mapping congruency (congruent 
or incongruent with expectations) was conducted. The ANOVA revealed a significant main 
effect of practice, F(2,52) = 9.92, p < .001. Target selection accuracy increased as practice 
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increased (first third: M = .83, SE = .02; middle third: M = .85, SE = .02; and last third 4: M 
= .87, SE = .02). A linear contrast accounted for 99% of the variance among these means.  
Practice did not interact with any other experimental variable. So, although performance 
improved with practice, the small amount of practice within each block was insufficient to 
produce the level of change within a button-to-action mapping long-term memory structure 
that would support qualitative differences in performance.  
Figure 4 shows mean accuracy, collapsed over practice, as a function of movement 
type, button spatial configuration, working memory load, and mapping congruency. There 
was a significant main effect of movement type, F(1,26) = 42.88, p < .001, showing that 
accuracy in affordance movements (M = .89, SE = .02) was higher than in convention 
movements (M = .81, SE = .02). There was a main effect of mapping congruency, F(1,26) = 
46.66, p < .001, showing that congruent button-to-action mappings (M = .92, SE = .01) 
allowed more accurate responses as compared to incongruent mappings (M = .78, SE = .02). 
The Movement type x Button configuration interaction effect was significant, F(1,26) = 8.64, 
p = .007, as was the Movement type x Button configuration x Working memory load x 
Mapping congruency interaction effect, F(1, 26) = 4.81, p = .04.  In order to examine the 
nature of these interactions, separate analyses were computed for each interaction type.  
 Affordances 
A 2 x 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA on target selection accuracy in the affordance 
movements with the variables button spatial configuration (vertical or horizontal), working 
memory load (two or four letters) and mapping congruency (congruent or incongruent with 
expectations) revealed only a main effect of button-to-action mapping congruency. Accuracy 
was significantly higher in the affordance conditions with a congruent button-to-action  
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Figure 4. Mean target selection accuracy as a function of movement type (affordance vs. 
convention), button configuration (horizontal vs. vertical), working memory load (low vs. 
high), and mapping congruency (congruent vs. incongruent).  
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mapping (M = .96, SE = .01) than with an incongruent button-to-action mapping (M = .81, SE 
= .03), F(1,26) = 39.65, p < .001. Target selection accuracy in the congruent affordance 
movements was very near the ceiling. 
  Conventions 
A similar 2 x 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA on accuracy in the convention 
movements revealed a more complex pattern. There was a main effect of button 
configuration in which accuracy was slightly higher with the vertical buttons (M = .83; SE = 
.02) than the horizontal buttons (M = .79, SE = .02), F(1,26) = 5.33, p = .029.  This difference 
is in line with the results of Experiment 1 suggesting that the vertical convention is stronger 
than the weaker horizontal bias.  Working memory load affected accuracy, F(1,26) = 5.11, p 
= .03, with slightly higher accuracy under a low working memory load (M = .82, SE = .02) 
compared to a high load (M = .79, SE = .02). And, as with the affordance movements, 
mapping congruency affected accuracy, F(1,26) = 30.32, p < .001.  Accuracy was higher 
with congruent button-to-action mappings (M = .87, SE = .02) than incongruent button-to-
action mappings (M = .74, SE = .03).   
Comparing Affordances with Conventions 
Button configuration had a main effect on conventions with higher accuracy on 
vertical buttons than horizontal buttons, however affordances were unaffected by button 
configuration. Affordances are simply apparent, so there is no reason to expect that a vertical 
affordance should differ in strength from a horizontal affordance.  As noted however, higher 
accuracy on conventions with a vertical configuration than a horizontal configuration makes 
sense if the vertical conventions are stronger than the horizontal biases. Working memory 
load affected target selection accuracy when participants were acting on conventions, 
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however the affordance actions were unaffected. These two differences between affordances 
and conventions show that behavior based on affordances is different from behavior based on 
conventions. Further, the effect of working memory load on conventions but not biases 
suggests that conventions are drawing from a limited resource pool, but that affordances are 
not.  
Both affordances and conventions were affected by button-to-action mapping 
congruency. Inverting the affordances’ button-to-action mappings was expected to decrease 
performance, and it did. The finding that inverting the mappings for conventions also 
decreases accuracy confirms our interpretation of conventions as being the result of learning 
based on past interactions. Participants appear to have expectations concerning which button 
goes with which action, and these expectations affect current actions. Interestingly, the effect 
of congruency did not appear to be different for affordances and conventions (i.e., the 
Movement type x Congruency interaction effect was not significant), suggesting that the cost 
to target selection accuracy of violating an affordance and a convention are roughly 
comparable. Although this evidence stems from a null result, it is theoretically unexpected. 
However, it is important to note that accuracy in the congruent affordance movements 
approached ceiling, which may have prevented detection of an interaction. Future research 
designed to examine whether congruency effects are similar between affordances and 
conventions will need to use a more difficult task that is not limited by a ceiling. 
 Target Selection Response Time 
 Only response time data associated with a correct target selection were included 
within these analyses. The data from one participant were omitted because there were too 
many missing values. A 3 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with the variables 
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practice (thirds), movement type (affordance or convention), button spatial configuration 
(vertical or horizontal), working memory load (two or four letters) and mapping congruency 
(congruent or incongruent with expectations) was conducted. All five main effects were 
significant. There was a significant main effect of practice, F(2,50) = 10.73, p < .001 in 
which response time linearly decreased with practice (first third: M = 755 msec, SE = 42.7; 
middle third: M = 705 msec, SE = 38.0; and last third 4: M = 677 msec, SE = 35.0). A linear 
contrast accounted for 97% of the variance among the means.  Thus, the response times 
confirm what was found in accuracy: Practice improves performance. Practice did not 
interact with any other experimental variable.  
A significant main effect of movement type, F(1, 25) = 20.06, p < .001, showed faster 
responses for affordance-based movements (M = 673 msec, SE = 31.9) than for convention-
based movements (M = 751 msec, SE = 43.9). A significant main effect of button 
configuration, F(1,25) = 4.74, p = .039, showed that movements with the horizontal button 
configuration (M = 694 msec, SE = 34.7) were faster than with the vertical button 
configuration (M = 730 msec, SE = 41.5). A significant main effect of mapping congruency, 
F(1,25) = 18.79, p < .001, showed that movements involving congruent button-to-action 
mappings (M = 625 msec, SE = 26.03) were faster than those involving incongruent 
mappings (M = 799 msec, SE = 54.09). The congruency effect was as predicted and was also 
present in the accuracy data.   
The Movement type x Button configuration interaction was significant, F(1,25) = 
8.49, p = .007. Mean response times for each of the four cells in the interaction are shown in 
Figure 5. This two-way interaction was examined by considering the effect of button 
configuration for each movement type. There was a significant main effect of button 
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configuration on affordance movements, F(1,25) = 14.79, p = .001, but not on convention 
movements, p > .97. Affordance-based movements with the horizontal buttons were faster 
than with the vertical buttons. This effect was not predicted and was not present in the 
accuracy data.  
 
Figure 5. Mean response time as a function of movement type (affordance vs. convention) 
and button configuration (horizontal vs. vertical).   
 
We offer two possible explanations. First, it is possible that this difference may be 
reflecting a goodness of fit to a perceptual mapping for moving left/right with the horizontal 
buttons compared to the vertical buttons. The keyboard was slightly tilted, so the top button 
was ‘up’ in relation to the bottom button, however a far/near distinction between the two 
buttons may have been more apparent. Therefore, a far/near mapping to moving up/down 
with a vertical button configuration may not be as effective as a left/right mapping to moving 
left/right with a horizontal spatial button configuration. Second, because the difference was 
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only found in response time, it might reflect differences in how easily participants were able 
to maintain their fingers on the appropriate keys. The orientation of the hand for the 
horizontal buttons was more like the typical orientation for keyboard interaction than the 
orientation for the vertical buttons. 
 
Figure 6. Mean response time as a function of movement type (affordance vs. convention) 
and mapping congruency (congruent vs. incongruent).  
 
 The Movement type x Mapping congruency interaction was significant, F(1,25) = 
5.12, p = .03. Mean response times for each of the four cells in the interaction are shown in 
Figure 6. This two-way interaction was examined by looking at the effect movement type for 
each level of mapping congruency. There was a significant main effect of movement type on 
the congruent mappings, F(1,26) = 48.75, p < .001, but not on the incongruent mappings. 
The congruent affordance responses were faster than congruent convention responses, 
indicating another behavioral difference between affordances and conventions. There was no 
effect of movement type for the incongruent button-to-action mappings, p = .078. Although, 
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the evidence is provided through a null result, it appears that responding to an incorrectly 
mapped affordance was just as slow as responding to an incorrectly mapped convention. This 
provides some empirical evidence that violating learned conventions button-to-action 
mapping is as detrimental as violating an affordance’s perceptual mapping. 
 
Figure 7. Mean target selection accuracy as a function of movement type (affordance vs. 
convention), working memory load (low vs. high), and mapping congruency (congruent vs. 
incongruent).  
 
 The Movement type x Working memory load x Mapping congruency interaction was 
significant, F(1,25) = 5.80, p = .03. Mean response times for each of the eight cells in the 
three-way interaction are shown in Figure 7. We examined this three-way interaction by 
looking at the two-way interactions for each movement type. The Working memory load x 
Mapping congruency interaction significantly affected convention movements, F(1,26) = 
5.01, p = .03, but not affordance movements, p > .94. Examination of these interactions 
suggests a significant effect of working memory load only for congruent convention 
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responses in which congruent button-to-action mappings were faster under a low working 
memory load than a high working memory load.  
General Discussion 
There is debate in the literature about whether a distinction ought to be drawn 
between affordances and cultural conventions from the designers’ viewpoint (McGrenere & 
Ho, 2000; Norman, 1999; Oshlyansky, Thimbleby & Cairns, 2004). But, little empirical data 
exist to experimentally contrast these interaction design concepts (Still & Dark, 2008). The 
purpose of the two experiments reported in this article was to explore the cognitive attributes 
of design conventions and affordances. Experiment 1 showed that participants had prior 
expectations about convention-based button-to-action mappings. The button-to-action 
mappings were the same as we found previously (Still & Dark, 2008).  Experiment 2 
examined the effect of practice, working memory load and button-to-action mapping 
congruency on affordances and conventions within the context of a spatial target selection 
task. Experiment 2 demonstrated some behavioral differences between acting on affordances 
and conventions. Working memory load did not affect button interactions involving 
affordances, but did affect interactions involving conventions. As expected, both affordances 
and conventions were heavily affected by violations of button-to-action mapping 
expectancies.  
Manipulating the availability of working memory resources differentially affected 
responses based on affordances versus conventions. Working memory load had no affect on 
affordance-based interactions, however it affected convention-based interactions in that 
accuracy was lower when working memory load was higher.  These results suggest that 
interactions involving perceptual affordances use very little resources, while those involving 
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conventions require more. That is, acting on a convention is more accurate and faster under 
low working memory load compared to a high load. An inference that can be drawn from 
these data is that interfaces used by operators under a heavy working memory load should be 
designed to take advantage of perceptual affordances.  
Manipulating button-to-action mapping congruency had a large effect on participants’ 
responses. Congruent mappings were always faster and more accurate compared to 
incongruent mappings. Congruent mappings for affordances were associated with faster and 
more accurate responses as compared to conventions. This finding provides more evidence 
that affordances and conventions have differential impact on behavior. Additionally, when 
considering only the nonaffordance conditions, congruent convention (i.e., horizontal) 
mappings allowed faster responses than congruent bias (i.e., vertical) mappings.  
In contrast to congruent mappings, response times based on incongruent affordance or 
convention button-to-action mappings were statistically indistinguishable. Acting on a 
reversed button-to-action mapping produced a similar cost to the user regardless of whether 
the mapping reflected an affordance or convention. This finding suggests that the 
convention-based button-to-action mapping is a fundamental part of how the user views the 
world. The conventions produce expectancies. Violating an expectancy is detrimental 
regardless of whether the expectancy reflects the natural world or learned constraints. 
The findings from Experiment 1 captured the participants’ button-to-action mapping 
expectations. We replicated the basic pattern of our previous findings (Still & Dark, 2008), 
but with many fewer trials.  The results demonstrate that participants were not randomly 
pressing buttons when perceptual affordances were not available. Rather, they acted in a 
consistent manner that clearly demonstrated the existence of learned button-to-action 
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associations. The somewhat lower agreement among participants about the horizontal 
nonaffordance mappings (biases) than the vertical nonaffordance mappings (conventions) 
indicates that these learned associations differ in strength.   
We examined short term practice effects in Experiment 2.  We expected that 
differences in participants’ ability to overcome incongruent button-to-action mapping 
associated with affordances and conventions would be informative. We fully expected that 
incongruent affordance mappings would be more disruptive than incongruent convention 
mappings.  We found that target selection accuracy and response times improved in a linear 
fashion with practice (thirds) within each block. However, practice did not interact with any 
experimental variable. There simply were too few practice trials to observe differences in the 
rate at which participants were able to overcome their button-to-action expectations.  
Implications for Designers 
 Currently, designers adhere to interaction affordances and avoid violating what have 
been considered naturally occurring mappings. Part of the reason affordances are important is 
because they naturally communicate the design’s available actions (Norman, 1988). 
However, one can ask whether all natural interactions stem from innate perceptual 
information (Gibson, 1979) or whether some natural interactions might stem from learned 
cultural conventions (Raskin, 1994).  We believe that both perceptual information and 
learned associations affect a user’s expectations of what a design ought to offer in response 
to an action. On the one hand, the results of this experiment show that perceptual 
affordances, when mapped correctly, outperform conventions. On the other hand, violating 
the user’s expectations of a button-to-action mapping produced a similar cost whether the 
violation was of an affordance or a convention. 
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There is one distinction between conventions and affordances that is not 
controversial; that distinction is that conventions must be learned and physical affordances 
require minimal learning. Users are continually learning about and reacting within their real 
and virtual operating environments.  Each interaction produces a change in long-term 
memory and long-term memory influences the current representation of the situation.  Thus, 
continuous learning is cognitively reflected as a constant interaction between long-term and 
working memory. These memory interactions allow users to effectively operate within an 
overwhelmingly rich and complex world. Working memory operations affect structures in 
long-term memory (i.e., learning occurs) and those long-term memory structures directly 
affect expectations and facilitate interactions. As we have previously suggested (Still & Dark, 
2008), participants may have learned button-to-action mappings from interaction with remote 
controls, vehicle turn signals and computer monitor buttons just to name a few common input 
devices that support binary responses. The learned mappings lead to changes in long-term 
memory structures that facilitate real time processing. So, when a similar instance of 
interaction arises again, relevant structures in long-term memory become active, which leads 
to effortless and efficient processing of the situation and the response (Baddeley, 2002; 
Cowan, 1988).  
We associate this effortless interaction experience with the directness of an object’s 
function. Further, the degree of effort required for processing relates to the strength of the 
representation that supports the interaction. A perceptual affordance’s representation is very 
strong; it reflects human evolutionary history. A learned convention has an initially weaker 
representation, but over many interaction experiences the representation grows stronger. We 
predict that through enough practice, a convention’s representation would grow to be as 
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strong as a perceptual affordance’s representation. Given sufficient practice (not provided in 
these two experiments) with a convention-based interaction, it should no longer consume 
limited working memory resources. By that logic, a strong distinction between affordances 
and heavily learned conventions should not exist within the design literature as both provide 
direct access to an expected response.  
Designers should attempt to reuse existing interaction conventions. The consistency 
guideline facilitates the transfer of arbitrary design associations into pattern knowledge 
making conventional actions automatic. As already noted, designs with interaction regularity 
facilitate the transformation of conscious interactions that consume working memory 
processing into effortless interactions that are automatic. Designers should not just focus on 
maintaining consistency to facilitate learning (e.g., Apple Computer, Inc., 1992; Nielsen, 
2002; Shneiderman & Plaisant, 2005). They also ought to try to maintain already learned 
pattern knowledge by maintaining their software’s design conventions across product 
families and updates. 
When an interaction is consistent, it allows users to draw upon their past experiences 
with technology to make predictions about how a system is going to behave. According to 
Hannon (2008), “…our ability to learn and use new technologies is contingent upon our 
experience with prior technologies. On a computer, for instance, each time we learn a new 
interaction idiom such as drag-and-drop, or double clicking, or scrolling, we adopt new ways 
of understanding how software applications and hardware devices work” (p.60). It is 
apparent that following previous conventions and including affordances within an interface 
ought to facilitate the usability of product.  
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Reusing a design convention requires being able to identify its existence. One 
difference between an affordance and a convention is the potential visibility of its existence 
to designers. Affordances should be common across people.  We have suggested that many 
users hold the same conventions, so some might be tempted to simply test new interactions 
on themselves in order to determine whether a convention exists in their new design. The 
problem is that designers may not be able to perceive their users’ conventions. The 
perception of a convention depends on an individual’s previous interaction experience with 
an interface. Thus, when designers do not have a similar interaction history as their users, the 
designers might easily overlook a conventional use. It is often the case that a designer’s 
perception of an interface and motivation towards its use is much different from the users. 
The difference is explained by the designer’s unique experience with the design, which 
includes the weeks or months spent thinking about and interacting with the new interface. 
This additional experience with a design may make it very difficult to identify previous 
conventional usages and in fact may lead the designer to see the new interface as being 
natural. As a result, a designer may accidentally violate a convention and thus require the 
users to overcome conventional usage, which requires them to engage in controlled 
processing and expend additional cognitive effort.  
Previously, we suggested that affordances and conventions are not behaviorally 
distinguishable (Still & Dark, 2008).  That conclusion was based on a task in which there was 
no correct answer and no feedback or working memory load.  In the current research, when 
we added those dimensions in Experiment 2, we demonstrated that behavior based on 
naturally occurring affordances was differentially affected compared to behavior based on 
learned conventions.  Thus, affordances and conventions can differentially affect behavior.  
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We also demonstrated that violating a convention produces a performance decrement, just as 
it does for affordances. Thus, affordances and conventions can similarly affect behavior.   
An important takeaway message from our research is that conventions once learned 
are not arbitrary. A convention may appear unconstrained to a designer making an interface 
update, but that is not the case. Although conventions initially may have been arbitrary, 
learning does occur.  With sufficient practice, new structures are formed in long-term 
memory, which leads to appropriate actions being apparent to the user.   
In conclusion, our data provide evidence for both sides of the convention and 
affordance debate. It seems that Norman (1999) was correct in suggesting that there are 
actual behavioral differences between affordances and conventions and McGrenere and Ho 
(2000) were right to suggest that learned conventions do structure user responses toward 
expected actions. We propose that a synthesis of these two viewpoints will best serve 
designers. Designers should employ perceptual affordances when possible. When perceptual 
affordances are not available, designers should identify and reuse established conventions. 
Designers should avoid violating conventions, unless the benefit of the new design outweighs 
performance costs. 
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CHAPTER 5. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
My dissertation investigated the cognitive basis of affordances and conventions with 
the intent to provide a means by which designers could better predict the success of user 
interactions. Examination of similarities between affordances and conventions provides 
human-centered insight into how a user will perceive, process, and respond to design 
elements. Affordances are often highlighted for their properties of presenting possible actions 
to users that are easy to understand, thus making affordance an important usability concept. 
Determining the extent to which this is true of conventions also is important. My hope is that 
this research will allow future designers to create devices that make our lives easier.  
Traditionally, affordances were discussed within a Gibsonian framework where 
affordances arise from direct perception (Gibson, 1979). However, some authors describe 
affordances as being mostly perceptual while others describe them as being culturally bound 
(McGrenere & Ho, 2000; Norman, 1999; Oshlyansky, Thimbleby & Cairns, 2004). We 
suggest that both of these descriptions are correct, and that they can be explained from a 
cognitive conceptualization of perceived affordances. The literature has yet to describe the 
cognitive characteristics of affordances or how a perceived affordance can be created. This 
dissertation introduces a framework that explicitly describes the process from which 
perceived affordances arise and the cognitive attributes associated with such an outcome. 
Within the framework described, perceived affordances result from automatic processing of 
information, that is, they result from an interaction between long-term memory structures and 
current information in the environment. As such, perceived affordances can reflect many 
different types of constraint; they are not limited to just physical constraints. Automatic 
processing is defined as occurring unconsciously and quickly without any effort or need for 
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working memory resources. These attributes are also used to describe affordances. Though a 
perceived affordance is not exactly what Gibson meant by affordance, it does have relevance 
and applicability for designers. A number of authors have mapped affordances onto a number 
of different frameworks trying to achieve more applicability (see Zhang & Patel, 2006; 
Baerentsen & Trettvik, 2002; Vyas, Chisalita & Veer, 2006); the view laid out in my 
dissertation unifies these different frameworks into one appropriate for design applications.  
The cognitive view of perceived affordance clarifies the aspects of an interaction that 
are important for design. It does not focus on a particular type of constraint, but rather on the 
possibility that a constraint may be in play. A constraint may be the result of a history of 
consistent interactions, which leads to the formation of long-term memory structures that 
directly affect working memory representations without any intention or effort on the part of 
the user.   
Affordances emerge from constraints formed through interactions between an 
external object and the user’s personal characteristics (Gaver, 1991). In Gaver’s view, 
affordances are the result of an interaction between the external object provided physical 
constraints and the user’s perception. The current view extends this to include learned 
constraints and thus highlights the need for consistency in design. Design consistency is 
critical for producing effortless usage, because interaction regularity facilitates the formation 
of long-term memory structures that underlie perceived affordances. Current representations 
are molded by long-term memory structures and are activated by ongoing task needs, which 
drive the meaning of the specific affordance in play.  
There is a debate in the literature concerning whether a distinction between 
affordances and cultural conventions ought to be drawn (McGrenere & Ho, 2000; Norman, 
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1999; Oshlyansky et al., 2004). It is possible that in the absence of affordances, users develop 
conventions to resolve interaction ambiguity. In this dissertation, differences between 
affordances and conventions were explored through a button pressing task. The results show 
that affordances exist when the spatial button configuration is congruent with directional 
cues. When affordances were not available, most participants demonstrated consistent 
button-to-action mappings that define conventions.  
The results reported in Chapter 3 showed that affordances and conventions are not 
behaviorally distinguishable when participants perform button presses without feedback or 
working memory load (Still & Dark, 2008). However, the results reported in Chapter 4 
demonstrated that in comparison to interactions based on naturally occurring affordances, 
those based on conventions are more affected by manipulations of working memory and 
button configuration. Interestingly, violating the user’s expectations of a button-to-action 
mapping produced a similar cost whether the violation was of an affordance or a convention. 
It is my hope that the findings will impress upon designers that violating conventions should 
be avoided, just as is violating affordances, unless the benefit of the new design outweighs 
performance costs.  
The results reported provide evidence for both sides of the convention and affordance 
debate. It seems that Norman (1999) was correct in suggesting that there are actual 
behavioral differences between affordances and conventions and McGrenere and Ho (2000) 
were right to suggest that learned conventions do structure user responses toward expected 
actions. However, as implied by the statement that they both are supported, neither by itself 
is fully supported.  Norman suggested that conventions are qualitatively different than 
affordances, but the data suggest that the difference may be more qualitative. The cost of 
105 
violating interaction expectations were similar for both affordances and conventions.  
McGrenere and Ho suggested that a distinction between conventions and affordances should 
not be made, but working memory load did differentially influence responses for the two 
interaction types. The most likely explanation, in my opinion, is that after the initial learning 
period, conventions play a critical role in the perception of a design’s available actions just as 
do perceptual affordances. Based on the information, both theoretical and empirical, 
presented in this dissertation, I suggest that a synthesis of these two viewpoints will best 
serve designers.  
My future research will further investigate whether practical differences exist 
between acting on a convention (e.g., clicking a hyperlink) and acting on a physical 
affordances (e.g., pushing a remote control button). Additionally, I will explore different 
methods of capturing the conventional interactions that may be driving user expectations. 
Designers need appropriate methods for capturing those aspects of a user’s long-term 
memory structures that support the perception of conventions.   
In conclusion, knowing how the user might cognitively view an interface is necessary 
for the future development of devices that optimize successful system interactions. The 
ultimate goal of my research is to help facilitate the creation of technologies that effortlessly 
support the user’s task goals. 
The Designer’s Summary 
If I were to do an executive summary of the three most important points made in this 
dissertation for designers, they would be as follows: 
First, it is important to remember that interaction experiences are directly molded by 
long-term memory structures. That is, users are continuously learning from everyday 
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interactions and these learning instances directly affect future interactions expectations. 
Conventions contain arbitrary mappings, but with sufficient practice even arbitrary action to 
function mappings may grow to be strongly associated and become automatically processed. 
Such strong associations between actions and functions produce perceived affordances within 
interface designs.  
Second, when making design decisions about whether to employ a convention or 
perceived affordance within a design, it is important to consider the cognitive attributes of 
the user.  Designers already take into account the limitations of working memory. They also 
need to take into account the impact of long-term memory structures that support 
conventions and perceived affordances.   
Third, the actions of conventions and other perceived affordances are quickly 
apparent without any effort on the part of the user. For this reason, they are difficult to 
overcome with only limited amounts of practice, just as are physical affordances. Violating 
an affordance or a convention produces a similar cost on performance. Therefore, violating a 
convention should be avoided in design just as much as current designs avoid violating 
physical affordances. Designers ought to maintain consistency across interactions whether 
the affordance is learned or innately available.  
In sum, the empirical results from the experiments described in this dissertation 
provide designers with a couple of interface design guidelines. First, designers need to 
employ perceptual affordances when possible, especially when the user may be under a high 
working memory load. Second, when perceptual affordances cannot be implemented, 
established interface conventions should be identified and reused. This is because incorrectly 
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mapping an affordance’s or a convention’s action to function will lead to products that are 
more difficult to use.     
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